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Prior to the subprime crisis, mortgage brokers originated about 65% of all subprime mortgages. Yet
little is known about their behavior during the runup to the crisis. Using data from New Century Financial
Corporation, we find that brokers earned an average revenue of $5,300 per funded loan. We decompose
the broker revenues into a cost and a profit component and find evidence consistent with brokers having
market power. The profits earned are different for different types of loans and vary with borrower,
broker, regulation and neighborhood characteristics. We relate the broker profits to the subsequent




















Mortgage brokers act as ﬁnancial intermediaries matching borrowers with lenders, as-
sisting in the selection of loans, and completing the loan application process. Mortgage
brokers became the predominant channel for loan origination in the subprime market.
For example, in 2005 independent mortgage brokers originated about 65% of all subprime
mortgages.1 Despite the mortgage brokers’ central role in the subprime market, little is
known about their behavior and incentives, nor about the types of loans, borrowers, or
properties that generated proﬁts for the brokers. We study the role of independent bro-
kers in the mortgage origination process using a dataset from one large subprime lender,
New Century Financial Corporation, whose rapid rise and fall parallels that of the sub-
prime mortgage market from the mid nineties until the beginning of the subprime crisis
in 2007. Figure 1 plots the loan volume originated by New Century between 1997 and
2006 and the split between broker and retail originated loan volume. The rapid growth
between 2001 and 2006 mirrors that of the overall subprime market and much of that
growth stems from broker originated loans, underscoring the importance of independent
mortgage brokers.
Traditionally a mortgage broker operates as an independent service provider, not as a
direct agent of the borrower nor a direct agent of the lender. The broker charges a direct
fee to the borrower and earns an indirect fee—known as the yield spread premium—from
the lender. The broker’s services include taking the borrower’s application, performing
a ﬁnancial and credit evaluation, giving the borrower information about available loan
options, and producing underwriting information for the lender. Figure 2 plots the
unconditional frequency distribution of the broker gross revenues and its components
in our sample. The top plot shows the distribution of the direct fee portion of the
revenues, the middle plot shows the yield spread premium, and the bottom plot shows
the distribution of the total broker revenues. All the distributions are quite skewed—
1Detailed information is available at the National Association of Mortgage Brokers website at
www.namb.org.
1there are some extremely large fees and yield spreads paid out to the brokers.
The lender sets a schedule of yield spread premia that rewards the broker for origi-
nating loans with a higher interest rate holding other things equal. In addition, the yield
spread premium schedule often varies with loan, borrower, and property characteristics.
For example, if hybrid mortgages are more appealing to the lender and loans to ﬁnance
second homes or investment properties are less appealing to the lender, then the lender
may set higher yield spread premia for hybrid loans and lower yield spread premia for
second home or investment property loans. A more attractive yield spread premium
schedule may encourage the broker to focus on originating certain types of loans.
The mortgage broker is likely to trade oﬀ the potential beneﬁts of ﬁnding the best
loan product for the borrower—which may help the broker win future business—against
originating a loan product that may generate the highest revenues for the broker from
the current loan. We develop a framework that allows us to empirically examine these
trade-oﬀs and apply it to a large sample of subprime mortgages. The questions we seek to
address are: Is there evidence that mortgage brokers extract rents from the transactions?
For what types of loans or borrowers do the brokers extract greater proﬁts? Is there any
relationship between broker rents and the subsequent loan performance?
We study these questions using an extensive sample of mortgages originated by New
Century Financial Corporation. The sample contains detailed information on the credit
worthiness of the borrower, the purpose of the loan, the appraised property value, the
location and type of property, the type and terms of loans originated, loan servicing
records, and information on whether or not a mortgage broker was involved in the loan.
The sample also reports the fees and yield spread premia earned by the brokers, allowing
us to compute the total broker revenues for each funded mortgage.
Our empirical framework is based on the idea that in order for a mortgage to be
funded, it must be acceptable to the borrower, the broker, and the lender given the
information each observes. We model the interaction between the borrower and the
broker as a bargaining game over the loan terms and type, subject to the constraint that
2the lender will fund the loan. The framework decomposes the total revenues charged
by the broker into a cost of facilitating the match and a component that reﬂects the
broker’s proﬁts. The lender’s surplus is the net present value to the lender from funding
the loan less the yield spread premium paid to the mortgage broker. The lender aﬀects
the broker’s behavior indirectly via the yield spread schedule and directly via the decision
to fund a loan, and here we focus on the yield spread premium. The borrower’s surplus
depends on the beneﬁt that the borrower receives from the loan which in turn depends on
the value that the borrower assigns to owning the property and the valuation of various
mortgage attributes.
Some proﬁts must be generated in the chain of loan origination in order for both
the lender and the broker to be able to extract proﬁts. Why would competition not
eliminate such proﬁts? One possibility is that the range of diﬀerent mortgage products
allows suﬃcient risk-adjusted price dispersion to exist. Such price dispersion may arise
for strategic reasons as argued by Carlin (2009) and may not be eliminated by competi-
tion as shown by Gabaix and Laibson (2006). Research on household ﬁnancial decisions
provides evidence that individuals and households often make suboptimal decisions, see,
for example, Campbell (2006). More choices may also not lead individuals or house-
holds to make better decisions, see, for example, Iyengar, Jiang, and Huberman (2004).
It therefore is plausible that neither comparison shopping by borrowers nor more com-
petitive pricing by lenders would necessarily eliminate the price dispersion that enables
brokers to proﬁt from originating the loans.
We estimate a stochastic frontier model that decomposes the broker’s revenues into a
cost component and a proﬁt component. The decomposition rests on the idea that when
the borrower uses the broker, the broker will only propose loans with non-negative broker
proﬁt. The decomposition is identiﬁed in our sample because of the empirical skewness,
illustrated by Figure 2, in the total broker revenues. In our sample, the mean broker
revenue is $5,300 per loan, and our decomposition attributes approximately $1,100 to
broker proﬁts. We ﬁnd evidence that hybrid and piggyback loans are particularly prof-
3itable in part because the yield spread premia are higher for such loans, whereas balloon
loans are more proﬁtable in part because the direct fees are higher. In general, brokers
earn greater proﬁts from originating loans in neighborhoods with a greater fraction of
minority populations. We ﬁnd some evidence that stricter state regulations of the lending
practices and of mortgage brokers are associated with lower broker proﬁts.
To investigate the relationship between broker proﬁts and the subsequent loan perfor-
mance, we estimate a Cox proportional hazard model for loan delinquency. The estimates
imply that the marginal eﬀect of broker proﬁts is positive for future delinquency once
we condition on characteristics of the loan, the borrower and the broker, suggesting that
brokers earned high proﬁts on loans that turned out to be riskier ex post. To determine
if the eﬀect is primarily driven by the direct fees or by the yield spread premium, we con-
dition on the ratio of fees to loan amount and yield spread premia to loan amount in the
hazard model. We ﬁnd that abnormally high fees increase the delinquency hazard rate
whereas abnormally high yield spread premia decrease the hazard rate, indicating that
abnormally high broker fees may play an important role in predicting high delinquency
rates. The relationship between broker proﬁts and the risk of delinquency is present for
the whole sample period although it is somewhat stronger during the last few years.
Demyanyk and Hemert (2009), as well as Mian and Suﬁ (2009), analyze the quality of
securitized subprime mortgage loans. Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2009) and Pur-
nanandam (2009) argue that the lack of screening incentives for originators and excessive
risk-taking contributed to the subprime crisis. Despite the prominence of brokers in the
subprime mortgage market, little is known about their behavior during the runup to the
crisis. El-Anshasy, Elliehausen, and Shimazaki (2006) and LaCour-Little (2009) compare
the rates on subprime mortgages originated by lenders through the retail channel and
through mortgage brokers. LaCour-Little (2009) shows that loans originated by brokers
cost borrowers more than retail loans, while El-Anshasy, Elliehausen, and Shimazaki
(2006) do not ﬁnd support that loans originated through brokers cost borrowers more.
Woodward and Hall (2009) examine the total revenues paid by borrowers to mortgage
4brokers for a sample of FHA loans originated in 2001 and show that a substantial por-
tion can be attributed to broker proﬁts and that the broker proﬁts vary with borrower
characteristics, consistent with the brokers’ proﬁts stemming from lack of information
among borrowers. Our approach to estimating broker rents is similar to the one taken
by Woodward and Hall (2009) in that we use stochastic frontier analysis to decompose
the broker revenues charged into a cost and a proﬁt component. Garmaise (2009) studies
the length and intensity of the broker-lender relationship and ﬁnds that the quality of
loans originated actually declines in the number of interactions between the broker and
the lender.
2. Our Sample
Our dataset contains all loans originated by New Century Financial Corporation (New
Century) between 1997 and March 2007. New Century made its ﬁrst loan to a borrower
in Los Angeles, California in February 1996 and in 2006, New Century had more than
7,100 employees and 222 sales oﬃces nationwide. In 2006, New Century was one of the
largest subprime mortgage originators in the United States
New Century originated, retained, sold and serviced home mortgage loans designed
for subprime borrowers. In 1996, the company originated over $350 million in loans.
In 1997, New Century went public and was listed on NASDAQ. In 2001, the company’s
subprime loan origination volume exceeded $6 billion. Volume continued to grow rapidly,
and volume increased tenfold to over $60 billion in 2006. The company grew its product
oﬀerings so that by 2006, New Century provided ﬁxed rate mortgages, hybrid mortgages
which are adjustable rate mortgages that convert to ﬁxed rate mortgages after a number
of months, and balloon mortgages. In 2004, New Century restructured into a real estate
investment trust (REIT) and began trading on the NYSE. In February of 2007, New Cen-
tury announced that it would have to restate earnings for the ﬁrst nine months of 2006
and that it had record a loss for the last quarter of 2006. Increased rates of delinquency
5among recent borrowers and inadequate reserves for such losses were the proximate rea-
sons for the company’s troubles. New Century ﬁled for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection
on April 2, 2007.
2.1. Origination data
Our dataset contains detailed information on the credit worthiness of the borrower,
the purpose of the loan—either a property purchase or a reﬁnance, appraised value,
location and type of property, the type and terms of loans originated, origination fees,
yield spread premium, and information on whether or not a mortgage broker was involved.
These data provide enough detail to allow us to study the matching of borrowers with
loan types and the relationship between loan types and revenues paid and received. The
dataset was obtained from IPRecovery, Inc., and it contains information on all loan
applications and funded loans.2 We focus on the loans originated by independent brokers
as opposed to correspondent brokers, who are aﬃliated with New Century, and construct
a sample that includes all loans originated by independent brokers that meet a set of
sample selection and matching criteria. We present details on the sample construction
in Appendix A and descriptive statistics below. Table 1 lists variables that we use in our
analysis with brief descriptions. We discuss these variables in more detail in Section 4.2.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for our sample including the number of broker
originated loans, the average loan amount, and the number of brokers who originated
loans by origination year. After an initial jump, the number of loans and active brokers
stays relatively constant between 1998 and 2000. After 2001, the growth picks up and
both the number of loans and the number active brokers grow rapidly until 2006 when
the growth slows down again. Over the whole sample period, about 715,000 loans were
originated by 58,000 independent brokers with an average loan amount of $189,000.
The next panel shows that our sample represents subprime loans from all parts of
2As part of the New Century Financial Corporation bankruptcy proceedings, IP Recovery, Inc. pur-
chased from the New Century Liquidating Trust a collection of datasets on loan origination, loan ser-
vicing, loan performance, and broker data for loans originated/serviced by New Century between 1997
and its bankruptcy ﬁling in 2007.
6the country by providing the geographical breakdown of the properties. We break out
California, Florida, and Texas because they are the three biggest markets by number of
loans originated throughout our sample period. We break down the remaining markets
by the census regions—West, Midwest, South, and Northeast without California, Florida,
and Texas. As the loan volume grows the geographical distribution shifts away from the
Midwest to the South including Texas and Florida and to the Northeast. For example,
in 1997, only 11% of the loans were originated for properties in the South but by 2006,
the corresponding share had grown to 33%. Similarly, 3% of the loans in 1997 were
for properties in the Northeast compared to 17% in 2006. California’s share ﬂuctuates
between a low of 19% and a high of 32%, but without a clear trend. The regions that
grow more slowly than the rest appear to be the West outside California and the Midwest.
Throughout the sample period, 90% or more of all loans were originated in metropolitan
areas.
The next set of statistics shows the breakdown of the purpose of the loans. For
the whole sample period, approximately two-thirds of the loans were taken to reﬁnance
existing loans. Of all the loans taken to reﬁnance existing mortgages, the majority
involved the borrower taking out some cash. These percentages are comparable to the
ones reported for the subprime market in general by, for example, Demyanyk and Hemert
(2009). From 2003 onwards, loans to reﬁnance become less important and the fraction
of loans to purchase properties grows from 20% to 44%. The last two panels of the table
report the distribution of loans by type of occupancy and property. The majority of
loans are obtained for a single family used as the borrower’s primary residence.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics on the loans in our sample. We can match most
second lien loans in our sample with a ﬁrst lien loan by using a matching algorithm
that compares the date and place of origination, the broker, and the characteristics of
the borrower and the property. We provide more details on the matching algorithm in
Appendix A. We refer to the matched pairs of loans as piggyback loans and to the
7unmatched ﬁrst lien loans as free-standing ﬁrst lien loans.3 Piggyback loans become
quite popular in the last few years of our sample period with over 40,000 such loans
originated in both 2005 and 2006. Many, but not all, piggyback loans in our sample are
of the 80/20 type, so a natural benchmark of the total amount borrowed would be a 25%
greater loan amount than the ﬁrst lien amount. The actual diﬀerence in our sample of
piggyback loans exceeds that benchmark in all years, with the combined loan amount of
the piggyback loans exceeding that of the free-standing ﬁrst lien loans by 33% to 41%.
The next three panels of the table reports the distribution of loan types across major
loan programs—hybrid, ﬁxed-rate, and balloon loans.4 For the whole sample period,
hybrid loans were the most common ones followed by ﬁxed-rate loans. In the last two
years, loans with balloon payments become much more popular reaching 40% of the loans
in 2006. For most of the sample period the 2/28 hybrid dominates in the hybrid category
and the 30-year ﬁxed-rate loan in the ﬁxed-rate category.
Like many other subprime lenders, New Century had three levels of income docu-
mentation: full, limited, and stated. For a full documentation loan, the applicant was
required to submit two written forms of income veriﬁcation showing stable income for at
least twelve months. With limited documentation, the prospective borrower was gener-
ally required to submit six months of bank statements. For stated documentation loans,
veriﬁcation of the amount of monthly income the applicant stated on the loan applica-
tion was not required. Palepu, Srinivasan, and Sesia Jr. (2008) note that in all cases,
the applicant’s employment status was veriﬁed by phone (salaried employees). Stated
documentation mortgages were often referred to as “liar loans.” While there are some
ﬂuctuations year-to-year, the general trend for our sample period is to have fewer full
3It is worth noting here that we do not know if a borrower with a free-standing ﬁrst lien loan in our
sample took out a second lien loan with another lender. In our sample, the majority of second lien loans
can be matched with a ﬁrst lien, suggesting that New Century did not typically originate free-standing
second lien loans. Of course, that need not be true for other lenders, so our percentage of piggyback
loans may be viewed as a lower bound for such loans.
4We categorize each loan based on the ﬁrst lien loan, that is, we ignore the second liens of the
piggybacks in this case. A loan with a balloon payment shows up as a balloon loan regardless of whether
it is a ﬁxed-rate or hybrid loan.
8documentation loans and many more stated documentation loans.
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for the borrowers in our sample. We report the
mean credit score (Fico), the percent of borrowers with a Fico score at or above 620,
which is one commonly used cut-oﬀ for the subprime category, the monthly income of
the borrower, the combined loan to value ratio (CLTV) and the borrower’s total monthly
debt payment to income ratio. Both the CLTV and the debt-to-income ratios suggest
that loan amounts grew relative to both property values and income levels over the
sample period. The credit scores provide a bit more mixed meassage but if we compare
the ﬁrst couple of years to the last couple of years there seems to be a shift towards
borrowers with higher credit scores. The next three panels break down the statistics by
full or limited documentation versus stated documentation loans and piggyback loans,
and show that a change in the composition may explain some of the observed trends.
The borrowers who take out free-standing, that is, no piggyback, loans with full
or limited documentation have credit scores that are lower and more stable than the
borrowers taking out piggyback loans. The stated documentation loans have higher Fico
scores and borrowers who take out piggyback loans have even higher Fico score. Part
of the rise in overall Fico score may therefore come from a change in the loan type and
borrower mix. The rise in CLTV and debt-to-income ratios can also at least in part be
traced to the balloon loans.
The last two panels highlight a diﬀerent side of the changes in the borrower charac-
teristics by contrasting the average characteristics of borrowers with Fico scores above
620 to those with Fico scores below 620. In 1997, the two groups have approximately
the same CLTV and debt-to-income ratios. But over the sample period, the higher Fico
score borrowers’ loan amounts grow more quickly both relative to the other group and
relative to their incomes. As a result, by the end of the sample period, the higher Fico
score borrowers have CLTV ratios around 90% and debt-to-income ratios of 41% com-
pared to 82% and 40% for the lower Fico score borrowers. To sum up, over the sample
period, the typical borrower’s creditworthiness increased as measured by the Fico score
9but their leverage and the debt-to-income ratios also increased, and this increase was
more pronounced among borrowers with high credit scores.
2.2. Broker compensation
As discussed above, a broker typically earns a direct fee paid by the borrower and an
indirect fee, the yield spread premium (YSP), paid by the lender. The lender’s wholesale
rate sheet sets the minimum mortgage rate based on a number of loan and borrower
characteristics. Brokers may then earn a higher fee for originating higher rate loans, all
else equal. Yield spread premia therefore are an indirect way for the lender to inﬂuence
the brokers’ origination activity. Brokers need not disclose the YSP to borrowers until
closing statements are signed.5 Exhibit 1 at the end of the paper shows an example
of a rate sheet distributed by New Century in March of 2007. (Source: “Subprime
Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy,” Wall Street Journal, Section: A1, December
3rd, 2007, Rick Brooks and Ruth Simon.) The main matrices show at what rates New
Century was willing to fund loans as a function of the loan program, that is, full versus
stated documentation, and the loan to value ratio (LTV), the borrower’s Fico score, and
several other loan features, borrower and property characteristics. On the right hand
side of the graphic, about half way down the page, is the YSP box that shows that on
this date a 0.5 percent higher rate than the minimum translated into a 1% yield spread
premium whereas a 0.875% higher rate translated into a 1.5% yield spread premium.
The rate sheet shown here can be viewed as a benchmark. Diﬀerent brokers may have
received a slightly more or less favorable set of quotes depending on their loan volume
and history.
Table 5 shows that the average broker revenue, as a percent of the loan amount,
declines steadily over the sample period from 5.0% to 2.8% whereas the dollar revenues
increase every year, with the exception of 1998, from $4,300 to $5,600 per loan. The
increase in the dollar revenue corresponds to an annual compound rate of 2.7% which,
5The yield spread premium is reported on lines 80–81 of the HUD-1 statement. A good faith estimate
of the closing costs that is required prior to the closing must include a range of the various loan-related
costs.
10depending on the benchmark, is on par with the rate of inﬂation. The lower percentage
revenues and relatively modest growth in dollar revenues may reﬂect increased competi-
tion with more brokers doing business with New Century.
The third and fourth panels of Table 5 provide more systematic evidence by reporting
the skewness coeﬃcients for both the percentage and the dollar yield spread premia,
direct fees, and broker revenues by origination year conﬁrming that the distribution tend
to be right skewed. The dollar distribution may exhibit more right skewness because
loan amounts are naturally right skewed as well, but the property is present even in the
percentage revenues.
Figure 3 provides further evidence on the distribution of broker revenues across dif-
ferent types of loans; ﬁxed-rate versus hybrid loans, free-standing ﬁrst lien loans versus
piggyback loans, full or limited documentation versus stated documentation; loans with
no prepayment penalty versus loans with prepayment penalty; and low versus high credit
score loans. The right skewness in the distributions appears to be a robust characteristic
across the diﬀerent types of loans. The distribution also appears to shift with the type
of loan. For example, the distribution for hybrid loans appears to be shifted to the right
compared with that for ﬁxed-rate loans.
The bottom part of Table 5 provides additional information on the broker compen-
sation by the type of loan, loan amount, credit score and for diﬀerent levels of docu-
mentation. The ﬁxed-rate loans generate lower revenues than the hybrid, balloon, and
piggyback loans which generate above average broker revenues. For all types of loans, the
stated documentation loans generate greater broker revenues. On average, the greater
revenues for stated versus full or limited documentation loans comes both from fees and
the yield spread premium albeit that for ﬁxed-rate loans the yield spread premium is
the same regardless of the level of documentation. The bottom part of the panel con-
ﬁrms the previous results for skewness. Figure 3 provides some insight into how broker
compensation varies along diﬀerent dimensions.
To complement these univariate statistics, we report regression results in Table 6
11for Tobit regressions of the direct fees and yield spread premia on our conditioning
variables. These regressions illustrate that both fees and yield spread premia may vary
systematically, both for diﬀerent types of loans, e.g., hybrid versus ﬁxed-rate loans, and
for diﬀerent borrowers or properties, e.g., with the borrower’s Fico score or depending on
whether the property is a primary residence or a second home or an investment property.
The results highlight that for many loan, borrower, or property characteristics we observe
a trade-oﬀ between fees and the yield spread premia. For example, as expected, higher
mortgage rates are associated with higher yield spread premia, holding other things equal,
and lower direct fees albeit that the trade-oﬀ is far from one-for-one. Similarly, between
1998 and 2001 direct fees are rising in dollar terms and the yield spread premia are falling
followed by the reverse trend over the next three to four years. There is also evidence
of some trade-oﬀs with respect to loan characteristics. For example, we observe lower
fees and higher yield spread premia for hybrid and piggyback loans and the reverse for
stated documentation and balloon loans. Borrower with higher Fico scores pay lower
direct fees but generate higher yield spread premia. Below we will develop a framework
that allows us to address the question of whether these variations reﬂect diﬀerences in
costs or proﬁts.
2.3. Loan performance data
The data obtained from IPRecovery contains detailed loan servicing records on most
of the originated mortgages. For every year from 1999 to 2006, 93% or more of the funded
loans are part of the servicing data, except for 2001 (47%) and 2002 (30%). Figure 4
plots the percentage of loans delinquent as a function of the age of the loan by the year of
origination. A loan is considered delinquent if payments on the loan are 60 or more days
late, or if the loan is reported as in foreclosure, real estate owned, or in default. The left
panel of the ﬁgure shows actual delinquency rates, which are computed as follows: Let
ˆ pk
s denote the observed ratio of the number of vintage k loans experiencing a ﬁrst-time
delinquency at s months of age over the number of vintage k loans that either are still
12active in the servicing data after s months or experience a ﬁrst-time delinquency at age












, for k = 1999,...,2005.
We ﬁnd that loans originated in 1999, 2000 and 2001 have the highest unconditional
delinquency rates. Tables 3 and 4 suggest that loans originated during these years have,
on average, higher initial rates and lower Fico scores than loans funded later in the sam-
ple. We control for such diﬀerences in loan-level characteristics by computing adjusted
delinquency rates, which are obtained by using estimated coeﬃcients for vintage dum-
mies after controlling for loan, borrower and broker characteristics, and macroeconomic
variables.6 Following Demyanyk and Hemert (2009), we impose the restriction that the
average actual and average adjusted delinquency rates are equal for any given age of the
loan. The average actual delinquency rate, ¯ Pt, is deﬁned as
¯ Pt = 1 −
t ∏
s=1
(1 − ¯ ps),




s. The right panel of Figure 4 shows the adjusted delinquency
rates. The plot is consistent with the evidence reported in Demyanyk and Hemert
(2009) in that, after controlling for year-by-year variation in loan-level characteristics
and macroeconomic variables, loans originated in 2004 and 2005 appear riskier ex post
than loans originated earlier.
3. Framework
We model the underwriting process as follows. The borrower arrives to the broker re-
questing a mortgage loan. The broker evaluates the borrower’s characteristics including
the borrower’s credit quality and willingness to pay, and based on that information the
6Details are provided in Section 5.
13broker provides the borrower with ﬁnancing options. The broker submits funding re-
quests to one or more lenders, and the lenders respond with a decision to fund the loan
or not. Funding requests are submitted until the borrower, broker and lender ﬁnd an
acceptable loan. At that point, the mortgage is written. If no acceptable loan is found,
then no mortgage is written.
We consider some borrower i and broker j. To describe the terms of the loan bro-
ker j originates with borrower i, let P denote the loan principal. In what follows, we
assume that the amount P the prospective homebuyer wants to borrow is given. The
borrower and broker then have to agree on the type of loan, l—ﬁxed, hybrid, maturity,
documentation type, does the loan have a prepayment penalty, maturity, and so on—and
the loan’s interest rate r, so that L = (P,l,r) denotes the loan.
Let fi,j denote the total fees that broker j charges borrower i for originating the
loan, including the origination fee and the credit fee. Deﬁne νi,j as the borrower’s dollar
valuation for the loan as a function of the loan characteristics L. The function νi,j =
νi,j(L) measures the wealth equivalent beneﬁts that the borrower receives from the loan.
Assuming that the borrower is risk-neutral, the borrower’s total surplus from receiving
a funded loan L, and paying fees of fi,j, is
νi,j − fi,j.
The lender pays the broker a yield spread of yi,j for originating the loan. We use
Ci,j to denote the broker’s costs of originating the loan. It includes the broker’s time
costs of dealing with the borrower, as well as any administrative costs paid by the broker
for intermediating the mortgage. Both yi,j = yi,j(L) and Ci,j = Ci,j(L) are functions of
the loan characteristics L. Assuming that the broker is risk-neutral, the broker’s surplus
from originating a funded loan L, receiving fees of fi,j and a yield spread of yi,j, and
paying costs of Ci,j is
fi,j + yi,j − Ci,j.
14We assume that the terms of the mortgage loan can be described by a generalized
Nash bargain between the broker and the borrower, subject to the constraint that the
lender will fund the loan. Let F denote the set of loans that will be funded by the lender:
Fi,j = {L|lender will fund loan type L = (P,l,r) for borrower i and broker j}.
We use ρi,j ∈ [0,1] to denote the bargaining power of broker j relative to the bar-
gaining power of borrower i. If ρi,j = 0, the borrower has all the bargaining power, and
if ρi,j = 1, the mortgage broker has all the bargaining power. The funded loan contract
maximizes the generalized Nash product:
max
fi,j,L2Fi,j
(fi,j + yi,j − Ci,j)
ρi,j (νi,j − fi,j)
1¡ρi,j ,
subject to the participation constraints:
νi,j − fi,j ≥ 0, (1)
fi,j + yi,j − Ci,j ≥ 0. (2)
Condition (1) requires that the fees do not exceed the borrower’s valuation of the
loan and condition (2) requires that the fees plus the yield spread premium are greater
than or equal to the broker’s cost. The participation constraints can only be satisﬁed if
the gains to trade are non-negative:
νi,j + yi,j − Ci,j ≥ 0.
If the gains from trade are negative, the bargaining ends and no mortgage is funded.
When the gains from trade are positive and the terms of the loan are in the interior
15of F, the ﬁrst-order conditions imply:











Condition (3) is the direct condition for setting the fees: the fees are set so that the
total surplus is split according to the relative bargaining power of the broker and the
borrower. Using condition (3) to solve for the fees yields
fi,j = ρi,jνi,j + (1 − ρi,j)(Ci,j − yi,j). (5)
If borrower i has all the bargaining power, then ρi,j = 0 and
fi,j = Ci,j − yi,j,
so that all the surplus ﬂows to the borrower. If the broker has all the bargaining power,
then ρi,j = 1 and
fi,j = νi,j,
so that all the surplus ﬂows to the broker.
Condition (4) is an eﬃciency condition: the sum of the marginal gains to trade for
the terms of the loan are equal to zero, that is, the loan type maximizes the total surplus.
Recall that we have assumed that the borrower and mortgage broker bargain over the
loan type l and interest rate r, but not over the loan size P. If we relaxed that assumption
and allowed the loan size to be part of the bargaining, then similar eﬃciency conditions
would also hold with regard to loan size.
The lender eﬀects the loan underwriting process in two ways. First, the lender deter-
16mines the yield spread function, which determines which loans will be submitted because
the yield spread function directly determines the broker’s participation constraint in
equation (2) and eﬃciency condition (4). Since the broker’s surplus directly depends
on the yield spread, condition (3) implies that the fees themselves depend on the yield
spread. Second, the lender’s decision on which loans to fund determines which loans will
be oﬀered directly though the eﬀects of the constraints in the set of loans that will be
funded, F, on the generalized Nash solution. In our empirical analysis, we focus on the
ﬁrst channel while conditioning on the loan being funded.
For the funded loans in our sample, we observe the broker’s revenue equal to fi,j+yi,j.
Substituting in the equilibrium fees from equation (5), we obtain
fi,j + yi,j = Ci,j + ρi,j (νi,j + yi,j − Ci,j), (6)
which states that the broker’s revenue equals the cost of intermediating the loan plus the
fraction of the total gains from trade that the broker is able to capture. If the broker
has all the bargaining power (ρi,j = 1), the broker receives all the gains from trade, and
if the borrower has all the bargaining power (ρi,j = 0), the broker revenues are equal to
the costs of intermediating the trade.
From equation (6), the broker’s proﬁts can be high for a few reasons. First,the broker
might have high bargaining power, measured by a high ρij. Such high bargaining power
may arise because there is little competition among the brokers perhaps because the
borrowers have high search costs, or because the broker puts little weight on reputation
concerns. Second, the total surplus may be high for the loan. The loan surplus could
be high because the yield spread premium is high relative to the broker’s cost, or the
surplus could be high because the borrower have a high valuation for the loan. Such a
high valuation could arise because the borrower values the underlying property highly, or
perhaps because the borrower has optimistic expectations for future property values and
the ﬁnancing ﬂexibility in the loan, or perhaps because the borrower has a short horizon
17relative to the length of the loan. The framework thus allows for both opportunistic
brokers and opportunistic borrowers.
4. Estimating Broker Proﬁts
We now describe our empirical approach for decomposing broker revenues into costs and
proﬁts, and discuss the estimation results.
4.1. Decomposing broker revenues into costs and proﬁts
We are interested in empirically decomposing the observed revenues into a cost com-
ponent and the gains from trade captured by the broker. We deﬁne Xij as the vector
of conditioning variables the econometrician can observe. It includes a vector of charac-
teristics for borrower i such as Fico score and borrower income, a vector of the broker’s
characteristics such as the broker’s underwriting history and market share, and a vector
of overall market conditions such as the benchmark 30-year mortgage rate or recent house
price appreciation. Xi,j also captures the loan type L that is the outcome of the bargain
between borrower i and broker j.
We then parameterize the broker’s cost function as
Ci,j = C(Xi,j) +  i,j, (7)
where C(Xi,j) is the cost function conditional on loan, borrower and mortgage broker
characteristics, and  ij is a symmetric mean zero error term that represents unobserved
heterogeneity in the brokers’ costs. Let ξi,j = ρi,j (νi,j + yi,j − Ci,j) denote the broker’s
proﬁt. Then equations (6) and (7) yield
fi,j + yi,j ≡ C(Xi,j) +  i,j + ξi,j, (8)
where ξi,j is non-negative. Conversations with a market participant indicated that a
18brokers cost function is likely to be unaﬀected by the loan amount, the loan type, or loan
rates. But since our sample includes many brokers operating in many diﬀerent markets
we include the loan amount to capture diﬀerences in costs that may be correlated with
diﬀerences in the price of housing. To check the robustness of our results we also consider
speciﬁcations that allow the cost function to depend, among others, on the loan type,
the prepayment penalty, and whether or not the loan is a reﬁnance. Our main results
carry through to a range of model speciﬁcations.
The model in equation (8) ﬁts naturally into a speciﬁcation that can be estimated
using stochastic frontier analysis. Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) and Greene (2002) are
textbook references for stochastic frontier models. Frontier models are used to estimate
cost or proﬁt functions that are viewed as the most eﬃcient outcomes possible. Individual
observations deviate from the eﬃcient outcomes by a symmetric mean zero error and
a one-sided error that measures that observation’s ineﬃciency. Such models have been
applied in ﬁnancial economics by Hunt-McCool, Koh, and Francis (1996) and Koop and Li
(2001) to study IPO underpricing, by Altunbas, Gardener, Molyneux, and Moore (2001)
and Berger and Mester (1997) to study eﬃciency in the banking industry, by Green,
Holliﬁeld, and Sch¨ urhoﬀ (2007) to study dealers’ proﬁts in intermediating municipal
bonds, and by Woodward and Hall (2009) in studying broker proﬁts in the mortgage
industry.
In our application, the broker’s costs for underwriting the loan take the place of
the most eﬃcient broker revenue, and the eﬃciency term is a measure of the broker’s
proﬁts. If the borrowers have enough bargaining power, then the broker’s revenues would
be driven down to their costs, and the one-sided error would be zero. Measures of the
relative importance and determinants of the distribution of the one-sided error therefore
provide useful information about the brokers’ ability to earn proﬁts by underwriting loans.
In particular, the distribution of the one-sided error across diﬀerent loan characteristics
provides estimates of the relative proﬁtability of diﬀerent types of loans.7
7We note here that both the borrower’s and the lender’s participation constraints can also be esti-
19To arrive at an econometric speciﬁcation of the model, we impose parametric structure
on C(Xi,j), and on the distribution of the symmetric error  i,j and on the broker’s proﬁts
ξi,j. In particular, we assume




We parameterize  i,j as being normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation
σi,j. We allow for heteroscedasticity in the cost function by assuming that







In our base model speciﬁcation, we parameterize the mean and the variance of the broker’s
cost as a function of dummies for the year and the geographic location, as well as loan
amount.
The proﬁt function ξi,j is parameterized as an exponential distribution with mean
parameter λi,j. The ﬁrst two moments of ξi,j are
E (ξi,j|Xi,j) = λi,j,
Std. dev.(ξi,j|Xi,j) = λi,j.
We estimate speciﬁcations in which the exponential term has as parameter λi,j a log-linear
function in our explanatory variables Xi,j:







If the parameter β0 equals zero, then the broker’s proﬁts are zero: the borrowers have
all the bargaining power and there is no asymmetric term. The asymmetric term can be
also be zero if there is little dispersion in the borrowers’ valuations and the yield spread
mated using stochastic frontier analysis.
20premium schedule is zero so that even in a situation with symmetric bargaining power
there would be zero proﬁts. If the constant is non-zero, then there is evidence that the
brokers have bargaining power and that there are strictly positive gains to trade. The
gains from trade might be dispersed because the borrowers have dispersed valuations,
because the yield spreads are dispersed, or some combination of the two. Variables
that increase λi,j suggest higher broker bargaining power, higher borrower valuations
or higher yield spread premia, and therefore higher proﬁts for the brokers. Because of
the log-linear functional form, the coeﬃcients on the conditioning variables measure the
percentage change in proﬁts per unit change in the explanatory variable.
The stochastic frontier model is estimated from the right tail of the revenue distribu-
tion. Appendix B reports the moment conditions used in the model.
4.2. Conditioning variables
Our explanatory variables include characteristics of the loans, borrowers, properties,
and brokers, variables that capture diﬀerences in the regulation, neighborhood charac-
teristics, macroeconomic variables, as well as dummies for the year and the geographic
region. Table 1 lists the variables used in our empirical analysis with brief explanations.
The loan characteristics variables include indicators for hybrid, balloon, and piggy-
back loans; an indicator for loans with stated documentation; an indicator for loans with
a prepayment penalty; an indicator for loans obtained to reﬁnance an existing mortgage
and an indicator for cash-out reﬁnancing; and the combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV).
The benchmark loan is a ﬁxed-rate loan obtained to purchase a property. The borrower
characteristics include the borrower’s Fico score and the back-end debt-to-income ratio
(DTI). The property characteristics include indicator variables for second home or in-
vestment properties and an indicator for multi-unit properties. The benchmark loan is
obtained to purchase a single-family home that serves as the borrower’s primary resi-
dence. The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 indicate that loan applications for
second homes are rare. We include the type of property as alternative proxy for the
21purpose of the loan.
The explanatory variables determine the asymmetric proﬁt component, ξij, in equa-
tion (8) which is the product of the broker’s bargaining power and the total gains from
trade. Because we can only model the product it is not possible to determine if diﬀerences
in proﬁts are driven by diﬀerences in the brokers’ bargaining power or diﬀerences in the
total gains from trade—with diﬀerences in the gains from trade arising from diﬀerences
in the borrowers’ valuations or the yield spread premium. This is further complicated
by the fact that we do not observe the complete schedules of yield spread premia, only
the points for the loans that were originated. Nonetheless this decomposition allows us
to learn more about what drives broker proﬁts.
Our regulation variables capture state or local laws that deviate from the applicable
federal laws. The 1994 Home Owners’ Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) sets a baseline for
federal regulation of the mortgage market. Reports of questionable practices in the sub-
prime mortgage market in the late nineties led to new legislation that targeted predatory
lending practices starting with North Carolina in 1999.8 We apply the approach taken
by Ho and Pennington-Cross (2005) and Ho and Pennington-Cross (2006) to our sample
period, and use an index that measures the coverage of anti-predatory lending laws that
assigns higher positive values if the laws cover more types of mortgages than HOEPA.
In a similar fashion we construct an index that measures the restrictiveness of the anti-
predatory lending laws giving, for example, higher values to laws that put stricter limits
on prepayment penalties or balloon payments. Both indices capture diﬀerences between
states as well as diﬀerences over time as more states implemented anti-predatory lending
laws.
In some states, mortgage brokers are subject to diﬀerent types of occupational licens-
ing laws and regulations.9 We use the index of mortgage broker regulations constructed
8The impact and eﬀectiveness of anti-predatory lending laws has been studied by, among others, Ho
and Pennington-Cross (2005), Ho and Pennington-Cross (2006) and Li and Ernst (2007).
9Pahl (2007) presents a compilation of all state laws and regulations between 1996 and 2006. Kleiner
and Todd (2007) study the impact of occupational licensing on employment and earnings of mortgage
brokers and the outcomes for borrowers.
22by Pahl (2007). In addition, we use the minimum ﬁnancial requirement for mortgage
brokers. For example, states that require a surety bond of $45,000 are assigned a value of
4.5 for that year. Both indices capture diﬀerences between states and some changes over
time albeit these laws are more stable over time than the anti-predatory lending laws.
To capture more diﬀerences between markets we also include some regional and zip-
code level variables. We include the percent of the population in a given zip code who
is white. Much of the evidence of predatory lending practices that spurred the new leg-
islation came from areas with larger minority populations where subprime lending often
was more prevalent. We also use the census variable for the percent of the population
who is hispanic, and the percent of the population who holds a bachelors degree.
Goetzmann, Peng, and Yen (2009) report evidence of house price appreciation having
an eﬀect on both the demand and supply of mortgages in the subprime market. In our
setting, a positive demand eﬀect may increase the borrowers’ willingness to pay for a
mortgage which has the same eﬀect as increasing the broker’s bargaining power. We use
the FHA house price index to construct a variable that measures the lagged three-year
house price appreciation for each of the census divisions. We normalize the appreciation
relative to the national index and demean it.
4.3. Estimates for baseline speciﬁcation
Table 7 reports estimates for our baseline speciﬁcations. We show results for two
formulations of the cost function: a base cost function and a cost function that includes
additional loan characteristics. We discuss the diﬀerences between the two cost functions
for all speciﬁcations below in Section 4.6 which covers robustness issues. Here we focus
on the base case cost function that allows the cost of intermediation to depend on the
loan amount and whether or not the loan is a piggyback loan. The cost is increasing and
concave in the loan amount. The negative marginal eﬀect for piggyback loans implies
lower cost of origination, holding the loan amount constant. The variance of the sym-
metric error term is increasing both in the loan amount and the indicator for piggyback
23loans, implying more cost heterogeneity for larger loans and for piggyback loans.
The estimated marginal eﬀect on the loan amount is less than one and therefore the
broker proﬁt function is a concave function of the loan amount. The interaction terms
indicate that the slope changes for smaller and larger loan amounts but that the shape
remains the same. The mortgage rate relative to the 30-year benchmark rate is a strong
determinant of broker proﬁts, which is expected because the rate is a primary variable
that determines the yield spread premium. For example, a 25 basis point higher mortgage
rate, holding other things equal, implies an 8% increase in the broker proﬁts.
Based on the marginal eﬀects for the loan characteristics variables broker proﬁts are
substantially higher for hybrid and piggyback loans, for loans with prepayment penalties,
and for cash-out reﬁnance loans. The marginal eﬀect is close to zero for balloon loans
and for the CLTV, and the marginal eﬀect is negative for stated documentation loans.
The marginal eﬀects of property characteristics are negative for properties that are ei-
ther second homes or investment properties, and positive for multi-unit properties. The
borrower’s credit score has a positive marginal eﬀect on proﬁts that is slightly lower for
borrowers with Fico scores above 620. Below 620, an increase in the Fico score of thirty
points translates into approximately a 5% increase in broker proﬁts.
By comparing the results in Table 7 with the results in Table 6 we can gains some
additional insights. For example, the higher proﬁts for hybrid and piggyback loans appear
to be driven primarily by higher yield spread premia whereas the proﬁts for loans with
prepayment penalties or cash-out reﬁnance loans are in no small part due to higher fees
for such loans. For balloon, stated documentation loans, and for CLTV, the fees tend
to be higher and yield spread premia lower, producing a net eﬀect on proﬁts which is
approximately zero except for stated documentation loans.
The estimated proﬁts are increasing in the borrower Fico score. The estimates in
Table 6 suggest that this results reﬂects the net eﬀect of higher yield spread premia and
lower fees for higher Fico score borrowers. This illustrates how the lender’s yield spread
schedule, which appears to favor higher credit scores, is partly oﬀset by diﬀerences in
24direct fees. The broker’s bargaining power may be greater when dealing with borrowers
with lower credit scores or borrower’s with lower Fico scores may have worse outside
option and hence put a higher value on obtaining the loan. The results for the borrower’s
debt to income ratio are consistent with this interpretation because higher fees appear
to be oﬀset by lower yield spread premia with the net eﬀect being zero.
4.4. Estimates for speciﬁcation that adds regulation and neighborhood characteristics
Table 8 reports estimates for speciﬁcations of the frontier model that adds regulation
and neighborhood characteristics. The estimated marginal eﬀects for the race and eth-
nicity variables are consistent with greater broker proﬁts in neighborhoods or zip codes
with greater minority populations with potentially greater marginal eﬀects in areas with
a larger hispanic population. The estimated marginal eﬀects for the education variable is
negative suggesting that, holding other things equal, broker proﬁts are smaller in neigh-
borhoods with a more educated population. The results imply that either brokers have
more bargaining power in zip codes with higher minority or less educated populations,
or that the total surplus from the loans in such zip codes are higher.
The marginal eﬀects for both the anti-predatory lending laws and the broker regu-
lation variables are negative, consistent with lower proﬁts in years and states with reg-
ulations that were stricter than the federal HOEPA laws or stricter broker regulations.
Based on the summary statistics reported in Table A.1 in Appendix A, the average level
of both regulation indices increases from zero to approximately two between the 1997-99
and 2000-03 periods, which based on our estimates would have been associated with a
drop in the broker proﬁts by six to ten percent.
4.5. Estimates for speciﬁcation that adds broker variables
Table 9 reports estimates for speciﬁcations of the frontier model that includes bro-
ker variables. Brokers that have submitted loan applications in the previous month to
New Century earn higher proﬁts. The higher proﬁt could stem from such brokers being
awarded greater yield spread premia for loans with otherwise similar characteristics but
25is is also consistent with greater broker bargaining power. The negative coeﬃcient for
the broker’s fund rate indicates that for a broker who has submitted multiple loan ap-
plications there is a trade-oﬀ between proﬁts and the lender’s funding decision, albeit a
fairly small one.
4.6. Robustness
For each of the speciﬁcations discussed above we report results for two speciﬁcations
of the cost function. One speciﬁcation has a base cost function that includes relatively
few variables. A second speciﬁcation adds more loan, property, borrower and broker
characteristics as controls to the cost function to make it easier to assess the robustness
of our ﬁndings.
While the coeﬃcients on the additional loan characteristics are economically large
and estimated precisely, the results in Tables 7 though 9 show that the general pattern
of the coeﬃcients in the one-sided error is similar to results reported for the base case
cost function. Exceptions are the marginal eﬀects for loans to reﬁnance and loans with
a balloon payment, which drop signiﬁcantly. For loans to reﬁnance, the shift essentially
attributes the added revenue to costs rather than to the asymmetric error term, whereas
for balloons, high marginal eﬀects on costs are partially oﬀset by negative eﬀects on
proﬁts.
Adding property characteristics to the cost function leaves the marginal eﬀect of the
property type on the proﬁts large the same, but attributes the added revenue for multi
units to costs rather than to the asymmetric error term. Including the borrower credit
score to the cost function makes economic sense, for example, if the broker incurs greater
costs when dealing with borrowers with lower credit scores because such loan applications
require more work or are riskier for the broker’s reputation with New Century. Consistent
with this, the cost estimates in the second speciﬁcation decrease in the Fico score, and
decrease more for higher Fico scores.
Including broker characteristics in the cost function allows us to account for potential
26diﬀerences in the cost structure across diﬀerent groups of brokers. While allowing for
broker ﬁxed eﬀects per se is not feasible, we create distinct broker proﬁles based on
a broker competition variable and the broker’s past origination activity and fund rate
with New Century, and let the cost function depend on these. Table 9 shows that loan
origination is more costly at the margin if there are less housing units per broker in
the zip code where the loan is orginated, and for brokers that submitted three or more
loan applications to New Century in the last month. For the extended cost function,
the positive coeﬃcient for the number of housing units per broker is consistent with
the interpretation that areas with relative many housing units per broker may have less
competition between brokers, supporting higher proﬁts.
The above discussion of the decomposition or broker revenues focused on the marginal
eﬀects. It is important to note, however, that often the total eﬀect of a change in a certain
loan characteristic is more interesting than the marginal eﬀect. This may be particularly
true here since many loan, borrower and property characteristics are correlated. We
provide some evidence on the total eﬀects of changing some key loan characteristics in
Tables 10 and 11.
One approach to make the structure of the cost and proﬁt functions even more ﬂexible
is to allow for interaction terms with certain loan characteristics. We test the merit of
such an extension by re-estimating the model in columns four through six of Table 9
for diﬀerent strata of loans. The results are reported in Table 12. They show a similar
distribution of estimated costs and proﬁts whether of not the model is estimated on the
full sample or on the stratiﬁed sample. This indicates that the full model speciﬁcation
in Table 9 is robust to including interaction terms with a number of loan and location
dummies as these are unlikely to have a major impact on our decomposition of revenues
into cost and proﬁt components.
274.7. Broker proﬁt estimates based on frontier models
In order to further understand the results, Tables 10 and 11 report statistics for the
ﬁtted values based on the estimates reported in columns four through six of Table 9. We
select this speciﬁcation of the cost function because it produces conservative estimates of
the broker proﬁts. Tables 10 reports the mean and the median of the estimated proﬁts
based on the frontier model and the mean and median of the broker revenues by region
and year. Table 11 reports the mean and median of the estimated proﬁts, the revenue,
the fees, and the yield spread premium by diﬀerent loan types, borrower and property
characteristics, and regulation, neighborhood, and broker variables.
The ﬁgures in Tables 10 indicate that across all years and regions, the average broker
proﬁt is approximately $1,100 or 20% of the revenue. With the exception of 1997 the
average and median revenues tend to trend upwards and yet the proﬁts ﬂuctuate above
and below $1,100 consistent with the proﬁt margins declining somewhat over time. Across
the regions we observe a similar pattern in that revenues ﬂuctuate much more than the
proﬁts, consistent with a portion of the revenue diﬀerences stemming from cost diﬀerences
across regions.
The mean broker proﬁts for ﬁxed-rate mortgages in Table 11 is $800 compared to
$1,100 for hybrid loans $1,350 for balloon loans. The greater proﬁts for balloon loans
despite the negative marginal eﬀects in all frontier model speciﬁcations is explained at
least in part by greater loan amounts, higher credit scores, and by regional diﬀerences.
Piggyback loans generate on average a $1,200 proﬁt compared to $1,000 for free-standing
ﬁrst lien loans. Loans with prepayment penalties generate a proﬁt that is $150 higher
than loans without a prepayment penalty.
The neighborhood characteristics conﬁrm that brokers make more proﬁts on loans
originated in neighborhoods with greater minority populations. The education and reg-
ulation variables produce smaller diﬀerences in the proﬁts but the directions are all in
line with the marginal eﬀects discussed above. Active brokers make a $200 higher proﬁts
than inactive brokers. For the number of housing units per broker the total eﬀect re-
28verses the marginal eﬀect. A greater density of brokers or fewer housing units per broker
is associated with higher broker proﬁts.
Overall, our decomposition of the broker revenues provides economically and statisti-
cally signiﬁcant evidence of broker proﬁts consistent with brokers having market power.
In principle, higher broker proﬁts can be driven by higher yield spread premia, higher
borrower valuations, greater broker bargaining power, or some combination of the three.
It is diﬃcult based on our information to distinguish between these explanations. But in
some cases, for example for hybrid and piggyback loans or loans with prepayment penal-
ties, the main driver appears to be the yield spread premium. In other cases, for example
for loans to reﬁnance with or without cash being taken out, the driver is either greater
dispersion in the borrowers’ valuations for these loans or greater broker bargaining power.
We now turn to the relationship between the broker proﬁts and the loan performance.
5. The Eﬀects of Broker Compensation on Loan Per-
formance
The eﬀects of broker compensation on loan performance are illustrated by Figure 5 which
plots, for hybrid free-standing ﬁrst-lien loans with stated documentation originated in
California, the delinquency rate as a function of months from origination by year of
origination. As in Section 2.3, a loan is considered delinquent if payments on the loan
are 60 or more days late, or if the loan is reported as in foreclosure, real estate owned, or
in default. The left plot shows the delinquency rates for loans with low broker proﬁts, and
the right plot shows the corresponding rates for high-broker-proﬁt loans. Broker proﬁts
are estimated using the model described in columns four through six in Table 9. High-
broker-proﬁt loans are in the upper tercile of the conditional broker proﬁt distribution,
and low-broker-proﬁt loans are in the lower tercile of the proﬁt distribution. For each
origination year, the delinquency rate tends to be higher for higher-broker-proﬁt loans,
conditional on the loan type.
29To more formally establish a link between broker compensation and the ex-post risk-
iness of loans, we perform a duration analysis with 60-day delinquency as non-survival.
Loans that leave the servicing data for reasons other than delinquency are treated as
censored observations.10 Let T denote the time at which a loan becomes at least 60 days
delinquent or defaults for the ﬁrst time, and let Si,j(t) denote the probability that a loan
with covariate values Xi,j survives until time t. That is,
Si,j(t) = Pr(T > t|Xi,j).



















Cox proportional hazard models provide estimates of the bk’s, but provide no direct
estimates of the baseline hazard function hij,0(t).
Table 13 reports parameter estimates for several Cox proportional hazard models
that relate 60-day loan delinquency to loan, borrower, and broker characteristics, and
macroeconomic variables. We ﬁnd that the size of the mortgage has a positive marginal
eﬀect on delinquency rates, and that the marginal eﬀect is larger for very small and
for large loans. If the initial rate on the mortgage increases relative to the benchmark
10There is a vast empirical literature on mortgage termination, including Deng (1997), Ambrose
and Capone (2000), Deng, Quigley, and Order (2000), Calhoun and Deng (2002), Pennington-Cross
(2003), Deng, Pavlov, and Yang (2005), Clapp, Deng, and An (2006), Pennington-Cross and Chomsisen-
gphet (2007), Demyanyk and Hemert (2009) and Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2009).
3030-year mortgage rate, the loan’s delinquency rate increases, everything else being equal.
This is rather intuitive since a higher rate may indicate compensation for higher expected
delinquency risk. In addition, the higher the mortgage rate, the harder it may be for
the borrower to make the monthly payments. We observe a dramatic marginal eﬀect of
33-35% higher delinquency rates for hybrid versus ﬁx-rate loans, depending on the model
speciﬁcation. The eﬀect is still positive but somewhat less pronounced for mortgages
with a balloon payment at roughly 11-12%. We ﬁnd that the hazard rate increases
by about 30% for piggyback loans relative to free-standing ﬁrst liens, everything else
being equal. We also ﬁnd that loans with stated documentation have positive marginal
eﬀects consistent with the ﬁndings of Jiang, Nelson, and Vytlacil (2009). The results in
Table 13 show that hazard rates increase by about 20% if the mortgage is a stated-doc
loan, and by approximately 10% if it has a prepay penalty. Not surprisingly, a higher
CLTV leads to higher marginal delinquency rates. Reﬁnance, and especially reﬁnance
cash-out mortgages, have a negative marginal eﬀect consistent with the ﬁndings and
interpretation in Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006).
Table 13 shows that, everything else being equal, borrowers with higher credit scores
and lower debt-to-income ratios default less frequently on their obligations, consistent
with the evidence in Demyanyk and Hemert (2009). We ﬁnd that loans that were orig-
inated in neighborhoods with a higher fraction of white population, higher fraction of
hispanic population, or higher educational attainment exhibit marginally lower delin-
quency rates. The marginal eﬀect for the regulation variables are mixed with lower
marginal delinquency rates for loans originated in states that cover a wider range of
loans with anti-predatory lending laws and states with a higher Pahl index of mortgage
broker regulation. Our results show that increased broker competition is consistent with
higher hazard rates. After controlling for these loan, borrower and broker characteris-
tics, we ﬁnd that the adjusted delinquency rate increased throughout much of our sample
period, peaking in 2005.
The estimates in Table 13 also controls for the percentage direct fees and the per-
31centage yield spread premia the broker receives. Speciﬁcation I shows that, holding all
else equal, abnormally high percentage fees and abnormally low yield spread premia are
associated with higher delinquency rates. In particular, after controlling for all observ-
able conditioning variables, it appears that the lender paid higher yield spreads for loans
that turned out to be safer ex-post. Holding yield spreads the same, fees can diﬀer across
borrower-broker pairs with the same observable characteristics either due to a diﬀerence
in bargaining power, or due to unobserved information that accounts for diﬀerences in
borrower valuations and/or the broker’s cost, see equation (6).
Speciﬁcation II in Table 13 repeats the hazard rate estimation with additional tempo-
ral interaction terms for the percentage fees and yield spreads. For both the direct and
indirect compensation channel, we observe that during the second half of our sample,
from 2004 to 2006, mortgage brokers were compensated marginally better for loans that
turned out to be more risky ex-post. As a result, abnormal fees paid by the borrower
are even more indicative of higher future delinquencies during the second half of our
sample than they were prior to 2004. And while the lender, conditional on all observable
characteristics, paid higher abnormal yield spread premia for loans that turned out to be
safer ex-post prior to 2004, the overall eﬀect of abnormal yield spreads on delinquency
rates is no longer signiﬁcant during the 2004-6 period.
Speciﬁcations III and IV in Table 13 repeat the analysis after replacing percentage
fees with log broker proﬁts as estimated in columns four through six in the previous
speciﬁcations. The marginal eﬀects of loan, borrower and broker characteristics on loan
performance are similar to those in the previous table. Note, however, that an increase
in broker competition, measured as a decrease in the number of housing units per broker
in a zip code, now yields signiﬁcantly higher hazard rates. A one-standard-deviation
increase in the number of housing units per broker leads to a 1.3% decrease in hazard
rates, everything else being the same.
The marginal eﬀects for broker proﬁts are positive, suggesting that brokers earned
high proﬁts on loans that turned out to be riskier ex post. During the 1999-2006 period,
32an increase in broker proﬁts by 10% was associated with roughly a 2% increase in delin-
quency rates, all else equal. This eﬀect was even more pronounced during the 2004-6
period. In the context of equations (6) through (8), this implies that as the fraction
of the total gains from trade that the broker is able to capture, ρi,j (νi,j + yi,j − Ci,j),
increases, ex-post delinquency rates rise. Holding yield spreads the same, broker proﬁts
can diﬀer across borrower-broker pairs with the same observable characteristics either
due to a diﬀerence in bargaining power, or due to unobserved information that accounts
for diﬀerences in borrower valuations and/or the broker’s cost. This allows us draw
conclusions about the marginal eﬀect of bargaining power and borrower valuation on
delinquency rates similar to those based on the results in speciﬁcations I and II.
6. Conclusion
The ﬁnancial crisis has led to new regulations for mortgage broker compensation and
consumer protection in the mortgage market. We contribute to the ongoing discussion
of the role of mortgage brokers by examining the incentives of mortgage brokers during
the runup to the subprime crisis. We ﬁnd statistically and economically strong evidence
of positive broker proﬁts, consistent with broker market power, that vary systematically
with loan, borrower, and broker characteristics. Broker revenues in our sample range
from an average of $3,700 in 1998 to $5,600 in 2005 and 2006. Approximately 70% of
that comes from the direct fees and the rest from the yield spread premia. We attribute
approximately $1,100 of the revenues to broker proﬁts.
The relative importance for proﬁts of direct fees and yield spread premia varies across
loans of diﬀerent types, borrower and broker characteristics. For example, greater proﬁts
for hybrid and piggyback loans appear to be driven by higher yield spread premia whereas
higher proﬁts on stated documentation and balloon loans appear to be driven more by
greater fees. Overall, our results point to a poor alignment of the mortgage brokers’
incentives and loan quality and performance during the runup to the subprime crisis.
33We relate the estimated broker proﬁts to future loan performance and ﬁnd that after
controlling for other factors, loans associated with higher broker proﬁts have a greater
risk of future delinquency. Proﬁts that disproportionately stem from fees increase the risk
of delinquency further. While both fees and the yield spread premia contribute to high
proﬁts, these ﬁndings suggest that the incentives provided by the yield spread premia
may have left too much room for brokers to try to extract proﬁts from the fees.
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Rate-benchmark 30yr rate Initial mortgage rate minus 30-year conventional mortgage
rate in %
Loan amount Loan amount in thousands of dollars
Log loan amount Natural logarithm of loan amount in thousands of dollars
Hybrid Indicator for hybrid mortgages
Balloon Indicator for mortgages with a balloon payment
Piggyback Indicator for a matched pair of a 1st and a 2nd lien loan∗
Stated doc Indicator for a stated documentation loan
Prepay penalty Indicator for a loan with a prepayment penalty
Reﬁ Indicator for a reﬁnancing
Reﬁ cash-out Indicator for a cash-out reﬁnancing
CLTV Combined loan to value ratio in %
Borrower Characteristics
Fico Fair, Isaac and Company (Fico) credit score at origination
Debt-to-income Debt to income ratio (back-end ratio) in %
Monthly income Combined monthly borrower income in thousands on dollar
Property Characteristics
2nd home/investment property Indicator for second home or investment property
Multi unit Indicator for 2-4 unit properties
Planned unit development (PUD) Individual ownership of unit, shared ownership of common
areas
Market Conditions
Benchmark 30yr rate 30-year conventional mortgage in %
Slope of yield curve 10-year minus 1-year Treasury rate in %
House prices Lagged abnormal 3-year cumulative house price
appreciation (OFHEO)
Regulation Variables∗∗
Regulation (coverage) Index of coverage of anti-predatory lending laws
Regulation (restrictions) Index of restrictions of anti-predatory lending laws
Broker regulation-Pahl Index of mortgage broker regulation
Broker regulation-KT Financial requirements for mortgage brokers
Neighborhood Characteristics∗∗
Race % white population in zip code
Ethnicity % hispanic population in zip code
Education % of population with a BA degree
Broker Variables
Housing per broker Number of housing units in zip code (in thousands) divided
by the number of brokers with loan applications in zip
Active broker Indicator for brokers with three or more loan applications
in previous month
Broker fund rate Ratio of funded loans to loan applications for active brokers
in %
∗ Details on the matching algorithm are provided in Appendix A.
∗∗ We provide more details and summary statistics in Appendix A.
38Table 2: Descriptive Statistics The table reports descriptive statistics for our sample of
broker originated loans. The sample period is 1997 to 2006. We provide details on how we
constructed the sample in Appendix A. Due to rounding, the percentages may not add up to
one hundred.
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 All
Number of funded broker loans (×1000)
Number of loans 4 15 19 19 30 67 113 142 157 150 715
Loan Amount (×$1,000) for funded broker loans
Avg loan amount 105 100 109 123 146 156 175 196 215 219 189
Number of brokers with funded loans (×1000)
Number of brokers 1 3 5 5 6 10 15 21 25 27 58
Geographical location (percent of funded broker loans))
CA 26 19 19 26 32 30 31 31 27 21 27
FL 5 8 9 9 8 9 9 9 12 11 10
TX 3 5 7 7 4 5 6 6 5 8 6
West w/o CA 20 14 13 13 12 11 10 14 14 12 13
South w/o FL, TX 3 14 15 13 12 12 11 10 11 14 12
Midwest 40 32 27 25 25 23 19 15 15 17 18
Northeast 3 8 12 8 7 10 14 15 16 17 14
Metro areas 91 90 89 90 91 92 92 91 91 90 91
Non-metro areas 9 10 11 10 9 8 8 9 9 10 9
Loan purpose (percent of funded broker loans)
Reﬁ, cash out 55 49 56 56 60 63 62 56 47 46 54
Reﬁ, no cash out 23 17 18 18 18 17 12 6 9 9 11
Purchase 22 34 26 25 21 20 26 38 44 44 36
Occupancy type (percent of funded broker loans)
Primary residence 83 79 86 91 90 91 93 92 89 87 90
Second home 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 1
Investment property 16 21 13 9 9 8 7 7 8 10 9
Property type (percent of funded broker loans)
Single family 84 82 83 81 80 79 78 75 74 75 76
2-4 unit 8 9 8 6 7 8 7 8 7 7 7
Condo 3 4 4 5 5 5 6 7 8 7 6
PUD 5 4 5 8 8 8 9 11 11 12 10
39Table 3: Loan Characteristics at Origination by Vintage Year The table reports de-
scriptive statistics for the loans in our sample. We provide details on our sample construction
in Appendix A. The majority of second lien loans in our sample can be matched precisely
on loan, property, borrower, and broker characteristics with a ﬁrst lien loan using a matching
scheme that we describe in Appendix A. A piggyback mortgages is deﬁned as a matched pair
of a ﬁrst and second lien for the same borrower and property. Any unmatched second lines are
dropped so our sample contains free-standing ﬁrst liens and matched piggyback loans (1st+2nd
liens).
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 All
Number of funded broker loans (×1000)
Free-standing 1st lien 4 15 19 19 30 66 107 117 112 109 598
Piggyback 0 0 0 0 0 1 6 25 45 41 117
Loan Amount (×$1,000) for funded broker loans
Free-standing 1st lien 104 100 109 123 146 156 174 194 209 211 182
Piggyback - - - - - - 231 258 288 298 282
Loan program (percent of funded broker loans)
Fixed-rate 24 36 31 18 19 28 32 23 19 15 22
Hybrid 76 64 69 82 81 72 68 77 75 45 68
Balloon 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 40 10
Fixed-rate loans (percent of funded ﬁxed broker loans)
30-year FRM 87 88 86 85 87 86 85 85 84 64 82
Other ﬁxed-rate 13 12 14 15 13 14 15 15 16 36 18
Hybrid loans (percent of funded hybrid broker loans)
2/28 65 85 88 80 96 95 94 73 50 34 66
Other hybrid 35 15 12 20 4 5 6 27 50 66 34
Full or limited documentation (percent of funded broker loans)
All 70 63 65 65 60 60 59 52 56 59 58
Fixed-rate 68 64 68 72 64 64 67 64 73 74 68
Hybrid 70 63 64 64 59 59 56 49 52 56 55
Balloon - - - - - - - - 50 52 52
Mortgage rate (percent)
All 9.9 10.0 10.3 10.9 9.6 8.5 7.5 7.1 7.4 8.5 8.0
Fixed-rate 9.9 10.2 10.5 11.4 9.7 8.4 7.5 7.1 7.3 8.3 8.0
Hybrid 9.9 9.9 10.2 10.8 9.6 8.5 7.6 7.3 7.7 8.8 8.3
Piggyback, 1st lien - - - - - - 6.6 6.4 6.9 7.9 7.2
Piggyback, 2nd lien - - - - - - 10.5 10.3 10.4 11.2 10.7
Prepayment penalty (percent of funded broker loans)
Prepay penalty 63 71 75 84 83 80 80 78 73 71 76
40Table 4: Borrower Characteristics by Vintage Year The tables reports descriptive statis-
tics for the borrowers at the time of origination. The mean credit score (Fico), combined
monthly income, combined loan-to-value ratio (CLTV), and the debt-to-income ratio (back-
end ratio) are reported along with the percent of borrowers with Fico scores at or above 620
for diﬀerent groups of loans. The bottom part of the table reports the average monthly income,
CLTV, loan amount, and debt-to-income ratio for borrowers by borrower credit score—at or
above 620 versus below 620.
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 All
All loans
Fico score 602 600 594 581 582 591 606 621 623 615 611
Fico ≥ 620 (%) 38 40 35 26 24 31 41 51 53 47 45
Monthly income 6 6 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 8 7
CLTV 74 78 77 77 78 79 82 85 86 86 83
Debt-to-income 37 36 37 39 39 39 39 40 40 40 40
Full or limited documentation, free-standing 1st liens
Fico score 597 596 588 572 571 579 597 603 599 591 593
Fico ≥ 620 (%) 34 35 30 20 17 23 33 37 35 28 31
Monthly Income 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 7 6
CLTV 75 79 78 78 79 79 81 81 80 81 80
Debt-to-income 38 38 39 40 40 40 39 40 40 40 40
Stated documentation, free-standing 1st liens
Fico score 615 609 605 597 597 607 613 624 626 617 617
Fico ≥ 620 (%) 47 46 43 35 34 42 47 54 54 46 48
Monthly income 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 8 9 8
CLTV 70 77 76 77 78 78 80 82 81 82 80
Debt-to-income 35 34 35 37 37 37 39 39 39 39 38
All documentation types, piggyback loans
Fico score - - - - - - 647 658 655 653 655
Fico ≥ 620 (%) - - - - - - 73 80 78 77 78
Monthly income - - - - - - 7 7 8 9 8
CLTV - - - - - - 100 100 100 100 100
Debt-to-income - - - - - - 42 42 42 42 42
Fico ≥ 620, all loans, all documentation types
Monthly income 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 9 8
CLTV 74 80 80 82 81 82 85 89 90 91 88
Loan amount 114 108 118 136 166 182 204 233 266 276 236
Debt-to-Income 37 35 36 38 38 38 39 40 40 41 40
Fico < 620, all loans, all documentation types
Monthly income 5 5 5 5 6 5 6 6 6 6 6
CLTV 74 77 76 76 77 78 79 81 81 82 80
Loan amount 99 95 105 118 140 145 159 175 193 198 168
Debt-to-income 38 37 38 39 39 39 39 40 40 40 40
41Table 5: Broker Compensation The table reports the mean and the skewness coeﬃcient for
the yield spread premium, the direct fees, and the broker’s total revenue with the mean on the
ﬁrst and skewness on the second row. The top of the table reports the statistics by origination
year, the middle part reports them by loan type, and the bottom part reports them by loan
amount and borrower credit score.
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Percent of loan amount
YSP 1.8 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.7
-0.3 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5
Direct fees 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.0 2.1
0.9 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.4
Revenue 5.0 4.6 4.5 4.3 3.8 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.8
0.8 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.4
Dollars per loan (×$1,000)
YSP 1.8 1.2 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.9 1.7 1.4
2.3 2.3 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.6
Direct fees 2.7 2.6 3.0 3.4 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.9 4.3
1.2 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Revenue 4.3 3.7 4.0 4.4 4.8 4.9 5.0 5.4 5.6 5.6
1.6 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0
Loan program All loans FRM Hybrid Balloon Piggyback
Full or limited doc? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Dollars per loan (×$1,000)
YSP 1.4 1.7 0.9 0.9 1.6 1.8 1.2 1.5 1.8 2.0
1.6 1.3 2.0 2.1 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0
Direct fees 3.6 4.0 3.5 3.8 3.7 4.0 4.9 5.2 3.5 4.3
1.5 1.2 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.4 1.0
Revenue 5.0 5.7 4.3 4.6 5.2 5.7 6.1 6.7 5.3 6.3
1.3 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.2 0.9 0.9 0.6 1.3 0.8
Loan amount Fico score
Loan amount/Fico score (0;$100] ($100;$300) [$300;∞) ≥620 <620
Full or limited doc? Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Dollars per loan (×$1,000)
YSP 0.8 0.8 1.5 1.6 2.7 2.8 1.5 1.8 1.4 1.6
0.4 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 1.5 1.2 1.6 1.4
Direct fees 2.3 2.2 3.8 3.9 5.9 5.8 3.7 4.0 3.5 4.0
0.7 0.7 1.0 0.9 0.5 0.4 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.2
Revenue 3.0 2.9 5.3 5.4 8.6 8.6 5.2 5.7 4.9 5.5
0.7 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.2 0.1 1.2 0.9 1.3 1.0
42Table 6: Direct Fees and YSP Regressions The table reports the parameter estimates for
Tobit regressions with the broker direct fees and the yield spread premia in percent and in
thousands of dollars as dependent variables. All estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%
level except for Fico×1(Fico ≥ 620), debt-to-income, 1998, 2001 (fees, %), for piggyback, 1998,
2001 (fees, $), for non-metro areas (YSP, %), and for Fico×1(Fico ≥ 620) (YSP, $).
Direct fees YSP
% $ % $
Constant 5.097 4.373 -2.728 -6.840
Loan Characteristics
Rate-benchmark 30yr rate -0.030 -0.216 0.491 0.886
Loan amt ($1,000) -0.006 0.009 0.001 0.010
Loan amt × 1(loan amt ≤ $100K) 0.003 -0.002 -0.0004 -0.003
Loan amt × 1(loan amt ≥ $300K) 0.002 -0.001 -0.0002 -0.001
Hybrid -0.170 -0.180 0.588 1.117
Balloon 0.165 0.436 -0.207 -0.461
Piggyback -0.196 0.010 0.214 0.815
Stated doc 0.072 0.296 -0.416 -0.752
Prepay penalty 0.306 0.513 0.129 0.216
Reﬁ 0.258 0.486 -0.181 -0.300
Reﬁ w/ cash out 0.231 0.382 0.050 0.068
CLTV -0.004 0.007 -0.010 -0.019
Property Characteristics
2nd home/investment property 0.0640 -0.185 -0.346 -0.591
Multi unit 0.162 0.633 -0.020 -0.069
Borrower Characteristics
Fico -0.002 -0.004 0.004 0.007
Fico × 1(Fico ≥ 620) 0.00001 -0.0001 -0.000001 -0.0002
Debt-to-income 0.00006 0.008 -0.003 -0.004
Market Conditions
Benchmark 30yr rate -0.021 -0.089 0.188 0.230
Slope of yield curve -0.056 -0.179 0.198 0.373
House prices 0.014 0.022 -0.003 -0.015
Location Dummies
Non-metro areas 0.010 -0.100 0.006 -0.031
FL -0.104 -0.538 0.111 0.238
TX -0.396 -0.748 0.570 0.858
West -0.256 -0.628 0.120 0.251
South -0.014 -0.356 0.107 0.211
Midwest -0.133 -0.790 0.182 0.311
Northeast -0.101 -0.316 0.125 0.314
Year Dummies
1998 -0.007 0.009 -0.495 -0.661
1999 0.217 0.302 -0.896 -1.125
2000 0.116 0.386 -1.048 -1.311
2001 -0.011 0.600 -1.236 -1.705
2002 -0.166 0.379 -0.801 -0.930
2003 -0.412 0.059 -0.630 -0.629
2004 -0.558 -0.161 -0.345 -0.098
2005 -0.500 -0.059 -0.355 -0.166
2006 -0.482 0.171 -0.719 -0.825
¾ 1.174 2.106 0.827 1.762
Number of observations 715,011
43Table 7: Broker Revenue Decomposition – Baseline Speciﬁcations The table reports parameter
estimates for the stochastic frontier model developed in Section 3. The dependent variable is broker
revenue in $1,000. The estimates for the cost function and the symmetric error variance function are
reported in the ﬁrst two columns. The third column shows the estimated speciﬁcation of broker proﬁts.
Estimates for yearly dummies, which are included in all equations, are omitted from the table. Columns
4-6 report the results for an extended cost function. The benchmark set contains all CA ﬁxed-rate
mortgages originated in 1997.
Base Cost Function Extended Cost Function
Cost Std. Dev. Proﬁt Cost Std. Dev. Proﬁt
Constant 1.3740 0.0280 0.0072 1.5370 0.0231 0.0100
(0.0345) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0588) (0.0010) (0.0012)
Loan Characteristics
Rate - benchmark 30yr rate 0.3025 0.3125
(0.0027) (0.0031)
Loan amt 0.0184 0.0182
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Loan amt £ 1(loan amt · $100K) 0.0030 0.0046
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Loan amt £ 1(loan amt ¸ $300K) -0.0038 -0.0042
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Log loan amt 0.8365 0.6180 0.8470 0.5845
(0.0051) (0.0135) (0.0054) (0.0148)
Log loan amt £ 1(loan amt · $100K) 0.0273 -0.0860 0.0413 -0.1490
(0.0013) (0.0037) (0.0014) (0.0058)
Log loan amt £ 1(loan amt ¸ $300K) -0.0032 0.0352 -0.0094 0.0530
(0.0011) (0.0034) (0.0012) (0.0032)
Hybrid 0.3895 0.1840 0.0297 0.2140
(0.0060) (0.0063) (0.0034) (0.0092)
Balloon 0.0391 0.0581 0.0431 -0.0201
(0.0083) (0.0119) (0.0053) (0.0122)
Piggyback -0.0849 -0.0115 0.5600 0.0632 -0.0096 0.4085
(0.0093) (0.0039) (0.0117) (0.0101) (0.0046) (0.0119)
Stated doc -0.2080 -0.0070 0.0017 -0.2120
(0.0049) (0.0059) (0.0029) (0.0075)
Prepay penalty 0.5985 0.2790 0.0410 0.3080
(0.0070) (0.0063) (0.0033) (0.0086)
Reﬁ 0.2210 0.2140 0.0630 -0.0033
(0.0082) (0.0099) (0.0049) (0.0138)
Reﬁ w/ cash out 0.2960 0.1420 -0.0263 0.2000
(0.0074) (0.0090) (0.0045) (0.0126)
CLTV -0.0076 0.0017 0.0004 -0.0092
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Continued on next page
44Table 7 – continued from previous page
Base Cost Function Extended Cost Function
Cost Std. Dev. Proﬁt Cost Std. Dev. Proﬁt
Property Characteristics
2nd home/investment prop -0.2815 -0.0504 0.0895 -0.3045
(0.0081) (0.0091) (0.0047) (0.0154)
Multi unit 0.2340 0.0948 -0.0412 0.1955
(0.0085) (0.0117) (0.0057) (0.0123)
Borrower Characteristics
Fico 0.00069 -0.00132 0.00008 0.00163
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00004) (0.00010)
Fico £ 1(Fico ¸ 620) -0.00008 -0.00005 0.00002 -0.00004
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002)
Debt-to-income -0.0003 0.0008 -0.0013 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Market Conditions
Benchmark 30yr rate 0.1035 0.0980
(0.0082) (0.0083)
Slope of yield curve 0.0770 0.0765
(0.0060) (0.0060)
House prices 0.0013 0.0023
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Location Dummies
Non-metro areas -0.0371 -0.0182 -0.0042 -0.05400 -0.02455 0.0173
(0.0079) (0.0048) (0.0118) (0.00777) (0.00473) (0.0120)
FL -0.1840 0.1110 0.0580 -0.27300 0.08600 0.1310
(0.0134) (0.0053) (0.0148) (0.01330) (0.00540) (0.0148)
TX -0.2350 -0.0850 0.2845 -0.17800 -0.08700 0.2050
(0.0128) (0.0068) (0.0164) (0.01330) (0.00695) (0.0171)
West w/o CA -0.4010 -0.0845 0.1185 -0.41100 -0.09250 0.1195
(0.0122) (0.0050) (0.0119) (0.01240) (0.00510) (0.0125)
South w/o FL and TX -0.2810 -0.0334 0.2065 -0.29800 -0.05200 0.2350
(0.0119) (0.0054) (0.0134) (0.01200) (0.00550) (0.0134)
Midwest -0.1850 0.0301 -0.0474 -0.21000 0.03390 -0.0825
(0.0114) (0.0047) (0.0134) (0.01210) (0.00497) (0.0161)
Northeast -0.2790 -0.0266 0.1785 -0.31800 -0.05050 0.2195
(0.0132) (0.0051) (0.0139) (0.01260) (0.00520) (0.0125)
Included but not reported: Year dummies for 1998-2006
Number of observations 715,011 715011
45Table 8: Broker Revenue Decomposition – Adding Neighborhood and Regulation Variables
The table reports parameter estimates for the stochastic frontier model developed in Section 3. The
dependent variable is broker revenue in $1,000. The estimates for the cost function and the symmetric
error variance function are reported in the ﬁrst two columns. The third column shows the estimated
speciﬁcation of broker proﬁts. Estimates for yearly and regional dummies, which are included in all
equations, are omitted from the table. Columns 4-6 report the results for an extended cost function.
The benchmark set contains all CA ﬁxed-rate mortgages originated in 1997.
Base Cost Function Extended Cost Function
Cost Std. Dev. Proﬁt Cost Std. Dev. Proﬁt
Constant 1.3520 0.0274 0.0101 1.4960 0.0229 0.0119
(0.0340) (0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0586) (0.0010) (0.0014)
Loan Characteristics
Rate - benchmark 30yr rate 0.2965 0.3060
(0.0027) (0.0029)
Loan amt 0.0185 0.0182
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Loan amt £ 1(loan amt · $100K) 0.0028 0.0036
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Loan amt £ 1(loan amt ¸ $300K) -0.0040 -0.0041
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Log loan amt 0.8370 0.7575 0.8460 0.7410
(0.0050) (0.0133) (0.0053) (0.0145)
Log loan amt £ 1(loan amt · $100K) 0.0245 -0.0805 0.0330 -0.1180
(0.0013) (0.0035) (0.0013) (0.0044)
Log loan amt £ 1(loan amt ¸ $300K) -0.0061 0.0402 -0.0087 0.0459
(0.0010) (0.0030) (0.0011) (0.0031)
Hybrid 0.4090 0.1720 0.0229 0.2470
(0.0060) (0.0063) (0.0034) (0.0094)
Balloon 0.0270 0.0632 0.0420 -0.0393
(0.0084) (0.0117) (0.0052) (0.0127)
Piggyback -0.0724 -0.0117 0.5805 0.0855 -0.0051 0.4200
(0.0088) (0.0037) (0.0114) (0.0100) (0.0046) (0.0122)
Stated doc -0.2200 -0.0071 0.0026 -0.2235
(0.0049) (0.0059) (0.0029) (0.0076)
Prepay penalty 0.5225 0.2790 0.0463 0.2425
(0.0066) (0.0061) (0.0032) (0.0087)
Reﬁ 0.2070 0.2020 0.0585 -0.0024
(0.0081) (0.0099) (0.0049) (0.0139)
Reﬁ w/ cash out 0.2605 0.1510 -0.0229 0.1555
(0.0073) (0.0090) (0.0045) (0.0127)
CLTV -0.0095 0.0018 0.0005 -0.0111
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Continued on next page
46Table 8 – continued from previous page
Base Cost Function Extended Cost Function
Cost Std. Dev. Proﬁt Cost Std. Dev. Proﬁt
Property Characteristics
2nd home/investment prop -0.2830 -0.0670 0.0840 -0.2750
(0.0081) (0.0088) (0.0046) (0.0139)
Multi unit 0.0775 0.1420 -0.0310 -0.0068
(0.0086) (0.0115) (0.0055) (0.0127)
Borrower Characteristics
Fico 0.00070 -0.00131 0.00005 0.00165
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00004) (0.00010)
Fico £ 1(Fico ¸ 620) -0.00008 -0.00005 0.00002 -0.00004
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002)
Debt-to-income -0.0010 0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0009
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Market Conditions
Benchmark 30yr rate 0.0705 0.1420
(0.0082) (0.0083)
Slope of yield curve 0.0860 0.1720
(0.0060) (0.0060)
House prices 0.0030 0.0023
(0.0005) (0.0005)







Regulation (coverage) -0.0464 -0.0444
(0.0015) (0.0015)
Regulation (restrictions) -0.0257 -0.0261
(0.0014) (0.0014)
Regulation (brokers, Pahl) -0.0081 -0.0061
(0.0020) (0.0020)
Regulation (brokers, KT) -0.0113 -0.0131
(0.0015) (0.0014)
Included but not reported: Location and Year dummies
Number of observations 715,011 715,011
47Table 9: Broker Revenue Decomposition – Adding Broker Variables The table reports param-
eter estimates for the stochastic frontier model developed in Section 3. The dependent variable is broker
revenue in $1,000. The estimates for the cost function and the symmetric error variance function are
reported in the ﬁrst two columns. The third column shows the estimated speciﬁcation of broker proﬁts.
Estimates for yearly and regional dummies, which are included in all equations, are omitted from the
table. Columns 4-6 report the results for an extended cost function. The benchmark set contains all CA
ﬁxed-rate mortgages originated in 1997.
Base Cost Function Extended Cost Function
Cost Std. Dev. Proﬁt Cost Std. Dev. Proﬁt
Constant 1.3390 0.0286 0.0075 1.5200 0.0252 0.0081
(0.0338) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0577) (0.0010) (0.0010)
Loan Characteristics
Rate - benchmark 30yr rate 0.3075 0.3190
(0.0027) (0.0029)
Loan amt 0.0182 0.0178
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Loan amt £ 1(loan amt · $100K) 0.0027 0.0037
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Loan amt £ 1(loan amt ¸ $300K) -0.0038 -0.0038
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Log loan amt 0.8245 0.7885 0.8265 0.7845
(0.0049) (0.0130) (0.0053) (0.0144)
Log loan amt £ 1(loan amt · $100K) 0.0237 -0.0785 0.0336 -0.1245
(0.0012) (0.0035) (0.0013) (0.0045)
Log loan amt £ 1(loan amt ¸ $300K) -0.0022 0.0314 -0.0038 0.0354
(0.0010) (0.0029) (0.0011) (0.0030)
Hybrid 0.4140 0.1820 0.0222 0.2470
(0.0060) (0.0062) (0.0034) (0.0092)
Balloon 0.0191 0.0497 0.0376 -0.0366
(0.0084) (0.0116) (0.0052) (0.0124)
Piggyback -0.0419 0.0039 0.5515 0.0908 -0.0020 0.4225
(0.0087) (0.0037) (0.0114) (0.0099) (0.0045) (0.0123)
Stated doc -0.2220 -0.0076 0.0045 -0.2285
(0.0049) (0.0058) (0.0028) (0.0075)
Prepay penalty 0.5305 0.2730 0.0412 0.2540
(0.0067) (0.0060) (0.0032) (0.0087)
Reﬁ 0.1960 0.1730 0.0427 0.0138
(0.0082) (0.0096) (0.0048) (0.0136)
Reﬁ w/ cash out 0.2480 0.1440 -0.0253 0.1520
(0.0073) (0.0087) (0.0044) (0.0122)
CLTV -0.0097 0.0020 0.0007 -0.0117
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003)
Continued on next page
48Table 9 – continued from previous page
Base Cost Function Extended Cost Function
Cost Std. Dev. Proﬁt Cost Std. Dev. Proﬁt
Property Characteristics
2nd home/investment prop -0.2765 -0.0516 0.0900 -0.2960
(0.0081) (0.0086) (0.0045) (0.0140)
Multi unit 0.0905 0.1470 -0.0261 0.0010
(0.0087) (0.0114) (0.0055) (0.0128)
Borrower Characteristics
Fico 0.00077 -0.00136 0.00001 0.00179
(0.00007) (0.00008) (0.00004) (0.00010)
Fico £ 1(Fico ¸ 620) -0.00008 -0.00005 0.00002 -0.00004
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002)
Debt-to-income -0.0012 0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0009
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0004)
Market Conditions
Benchmark 30yr rate 0.0735 0.0755
(0.0083) (0.0084)
Slope of yield curve 0.0850 0.0860
(0.0060) (0.0061)
House prices 0.0029 0.0022
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Broker Variables
Housing per broker -0.0034 -0.0068 -0.0003 0.0049
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0009)
Active broker 0.4500 0.2090 0.0560 0.2755
(0.0087) (0.0119) (0.0060) (0.0135)
Broker fund rate -0.0014 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0012
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Included but not reported: Neighborhood and Regulation Variables, Location and Year dummies





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































50Table 11: Estimated Proﬁts for Diﬀerent Loan Types The table reports the mean and median
broker proﬁts as estimated in columns four through six of Table 9, for diﬀerent types of loans. For each
loan type, we provide the same summary statistics for total broker revenues, direct fees and yield spread
premia. All values are measured in $1,000 dollars.
Proﬁt Revenue Direct Fees YSP
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Loan Characteristics
Rate - benchmark 30yr rate < 2% 1.06 0.79 5.62 4.98 4.13 3.60 1.49 1.10
Rate - benchmark 30yr rate ¸ 2% 1.08 0.72 4.77 4.06 3.15 2.67 1.62 1.28
FRM 0.82 0.59 4.45 3.84 3.56 3.02 0.89 0.54
Hybrid 1.14 0.82 5.52 4.83 3.78 3.23 1.75 1.43
Balloon 1.35 1.00 6.36 5.70 4.91 4.31 1.45 0.98
Free-standing 1st lien 1.04 0.74 5.18 4.49 3.71 3.16 1.47 1.11
Piggyback 1.20 0.87 5.75 5.01 3.82 3.23 1.93 1.69
Full or limited doc 1.01 0.71 5.02 4.35 3.57 3.04 1.45 1.15
Stated doc 1.16 0.85 5.66 4.99 3.97 3.43 1.70 1.31
No prepay penalty 0.95 0.64 4.89 4.12 3.22 2.60 1.66 1.25
Prepay penalty 1.10 0.80 5.39 4.72 3.88 3.35 1.51 1.19
Purchase 1.01 0.72 5.08 4.32 3.28 2.72 1.80 1.48
Reﬁ, no cash out 0.90 0.64 4.76 4.12 3.44 2.97 1.32 1.01
Reﬁ, cash out 1.14 0.82 5.50 4.85 4.08 3.54 1.42 1.05
Property Characteristics
Primary residence 1.10 0.79 5.38 4.69 3.80 3.26 1.58 1.24
2nd home/investment property 0.79 0.56 4.34 3.62 3.07 2.56 1.27 0.90
One unit 1.04 0.75 5.19 4.51 3.66 3.13 1.53 1.20
Multi unit 1.42 1.00 6.31 5.61 4.54 3.89 1.78 1.31
Borrower Characteristics
Fico < 620 1.06 0.74 5.10 4.43 3.66 3.12 1.44 1.14
Fico ¸ 620 1.08 0.78 5.49 4.78 3.81 3.25 1.67 1.30
Regulation and Neighborhood Variables
Race, ·66.7% white 1.24 0.90 5.73 5.04 4.28 3.71 1.45 1.07
Race, >66.7% white 0.94 0.68 4.95 4.31 3.34 2.87 1.61 1.28
Ethnicity, ·20% hispanic 0.97 0.68 4.90 4.21 3.36 2.85 1.53 1.19
Ethnicity, >20% hispanic 1.27 0.95 6.02 5.41 4.45 3.99 1.57 1.24
Education, ·15% w/ BA 1.04 0.73 5.04 4.35 3.70 3.14 1.34 1.05
Education, >15% w/ BA 1.12 0.81 5.67 4.97 3.77 3.24 1.90 1.54
Baseline anti-predatory regulation 1.02 0.71 4.63 4.04 3.28 2.83 1.35 1.08
Stricter state anti-predatory regulation 1.10 0.80 5.65 4.96 3.99 3.44 1.66 1.30
Broker Variables
Housing per broker, ·4000 1.14 0.83 5.63 4.98 4.04 3.50 1.59 1.26
Housing per broker, >4000 0.94 0.64 4.67 3.99 3.21 2.70 1.47 1.13
Inactive broker 0.96 0.68 4.95 4.25 3.37 2.85 1.58 1.24
Active broker 1.19 0.86 5.64 4.98 4.14 3.59 1.50 1.16
Location
Metro areas 1.09 0.79 5.38 4.69 3.80 3.25 1.58 1.24
Non-metro areas 0.80 0.54 4.21 3.61 3.03 2.55 1.18 0.98

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































52Table 13: Broker Compensation and Loan Performance The table reports parameter estimates
for Cox proportional hazard models for 60-day delinquency. Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
The benchmark set contains all CA ﬁxed-rate mortgages originated in 1999.
Cox proportional hazard model for 60-day delinquency
h(t) = h0(t) £ exp(Xb)
I II III IV
Broker Compensation
Fees/loan amt (%) 0.066 (0.004) 0.055 (0.005)
Fees/loan amt (%) £ 1(2004-06) 0.030 (0.007)
YSP/loan amt (%) -0.053 (0.008) -0.105 (0.010) -0.126 (0.008) -0.162 (0.010)
YSP/loan amt (%) £ 1(2004-06) 0.108 (0.013) 0.077 (0.013)
Log brk proﬁt 0.214 (0.011) 0.195 (0.014)
Log brk proﬁt £ 1(2004-06) 0.024 (0.014)
Loan Characteristics
Rate - benchmark 30yr rate 0.368 (0.006) 0.369 (0.006) 0.332 (0.006) 0.334 (0.006)
Hybrid 0.353 (0.015) 0.352 (0.015) 0.332 (0.015) 0.333 (0.015)
Balloon 0.110 (0.024) 0.117 (0.024) 0.118 (0.023) 0.121 (0.024)
Piggyback 0.344 (0.018) 0.366 (0.019) 0.264 (0.019) 0.271 (0.019)
Stated doc 0.197 (0.012) 0.198 (0.012) 0.221 (0.012) 0.221 (0.012)
Log loan amt 0.239 (0.019) 0.232 (0.019) -0.021 (0.021) -0.015 (0.021)
Log amt £ 1(amt · $100K) 0.026 (0.004) 0.024 (0.004) 0.046 (0.004) 0.046 (0.004)
Log amt £ 1(amt ¸ $300K) 0.034 (0.004) 0.037 (0.004) 0.033 (0.004) 0.033 (0.004)
Prepay penalty 0.110 (0.013) 0.105 (0.013) 0.088 (0.014) 0.089 (0.014)
Reﬁ -0.101 (0.018) -0.099 (0.018) -0.096 (0.018) -0.093 (0.018)
Reﬁ w/ cash out -0.083 (0.017) -0.083 (0.017) -0.094 (0.017) -0.093 (0.017)
CLTV 0.013 (0.001) 0.013 (0.001) 0.015 (0.001) 0.014 (0.001)
Property Characteristics
2nd home/investment prop -0.037 (0.0181) -0.0348 (0.018) 0.001 (0.018) -0.000 (0.018)
Multi unit 0.028 (0.0216) 0.0263 (0.022) 0.032 (0.022) 0.031 (0.022)
Borrower Characteristics
Fico (in 100) -0.604 (0.016) -0.605 (0.016) -0.633 (0.016) -0.633 (0.016)
Fico (in 100) £ 1(Fico ¸ 620) -0.025 (0.003) -0.024 (0.003) -0.023 (0.003) -0.023 (0.003)
Debt-to-income 0.004 (0.001) 0.005 (0.001) 0.005 (0.001) 0.005 (0.001)
Market Conditions
Benchmark 30yr rate 0.362 (0.020) 0.372 (0.020) 0.360 (0.020) 0.369 (0.020)
Slope of yield curve 0.062 (0.015) 0.060 (0.015) 0.051 (0.015) 0.051 (0.015)
House prices -0.006 (0.001) -0.005 (0.001) -0.006 (0.001) -0.005 (0.001)
Continued on next page
53Table 13 – continued from previous page
Cox proportional hazard model for 60-day delinquency
h(t) = h0(t) £ exp(Xb)
I II III IV
Neighborhood and Regulation Variables
Race -0.002 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000) -0.002 (0.000)
Ethnicity -0.005 (0.000) -0.005 (0.000) -0.005 (0.000) -0.005 (0.000)
Education -0.010 (0.001) -0.011 (0.001) -0.009 (0.001) -0.009 (0.001)
Regulation (coverage) -0.022 (0.003) -0.019 (0.003) -0.016 (0.003) -0.014 (0.003)
Regulation (restrictions) 0.0364 (0.003) 0.035 (0.003) 0.040 (0.003) 0.039 (0.003)
Regulation (brokers, Pahl) -0.020 (0.004) -0.022 (0.004) -0.022 (0.004) -0.023 (0.004)
Regulation (brokers, KT) 0.0082 (0.003) 0.009 (0.003) 0.012 (0.003) 0.012 (0.003)
Broker Variables
Housing per brk (in 100,000) -0.231 (0.130) -0.254 (0.130) -0.320 (0.130) -0.325 (0.130)
Active broker 0.006 (0.023) 0.005 (0.023) -0.019 (0.023) -0.016 (0.023)
Broker fund rate (nominal) 0.005 (0.030) 0.007 (0.030) 0.020 (0.030) 0.019 (0.030)
Location Dummies
Non-metro areas -0.017 (0.018) -0.019 (0.018) -0.022 (0.018) -0.022 (0.018)
FL -0.176 (0.031) -0.146 (0.031) -0.191 (0.030) -0.181 (0.031)
TX 0.035 (0.030) 0.054 (0.030) -0.002 (0.030) 0.010 (0.030)
West w/o CA 0.022 (0.025) 0.039 (0.025) 0.006 (0.025) 0.012 (0.025)
South w/o FL and TX 0.063 (0.027) 0.075 (0.027) 0.011 (0.027) 0.015 (0.028)
Midwest 0.152 (0.026) 0.164 (0.026) 0.140 (0.026) 0.143 (0.026)
Northeast 0.024 (0.025) 0.034 (0.025) -0.039 (0.025) -0.036 (0.025)
Year Dummies
2000 -0.118 (0.030) -0.121 (0.030) -0.111 (0.030) -0.113 (0.030)
2001 0.218 (0.032) 0.211 (0.032) 0.253 (0.032) 0.251 (0.032)
2002 0.247 (0.048) 0.245 (0.048) 0.271 (0.048) 0.274 (0.048)
2003 0.261 (0.057) 0.252 (0.057) 0.272 (0.057) 0.276 (0.057)
2004 0.459 (0.052) 0.265 (0.057) 0.461 (0.052) 0.392 (0.054)
2005 0.669 (0.041) 0.478 (0.048) 0.665 (0.041) 0.598 (0.044)
2006 0.681 (0.033) 0.489 (0.041) 0.677 (0.033) 0.608 (0.037)
Number of observations 651,419






















Figure 1: Origination volume. Annual loan amount funded by New Century from 1997 to
2006. Loans are originated either through the standard wholesale channel (broker), the retail
channel (retail), or by correspondent brokers.













































Figure 2: Broker revenues Unconditional distribution of direct broker fees, yields spread
premia, and the total broker revenues for funded ﬁrst-lien broker loans.












































































































































Figure 3: Broker revenues by loan and borrower types The unconditional distribution of
broker revenues for ﬁxed-rate, hybrid, free-standing 1st lien, piggyback, full or limited documentation,
stated documentation loans, and for loans without or with prepayment penalties, and for borrowers with
credit scores below 620 and for those with scores at or above 620.


























































Figure 4: Delinquency rates The ﬁgures show the fraction of loans delinquent as a function
of months from origination by year of origination. The actual delinquency rate (left panel) is
deﬁned as the cumulative fraction of loans that were past due 60 or more days, in foreclosure,
real-estate owned, or defaulted, at or before a given age. The adjusted delinquency rate (right
panel) is obtained by adjusting the actual rate for year-by-year variation in loan, borrower
and broker characteristics, census and regulation variables, mortgage rates, and house price
appreciation, based on the estimation results in Table 13, speciﬁcation III.










































Figure 5: Delinquency rates and broker proﬁts The ﬁgures show the fraction of loans
delinquent as a function of months from origination by year of origination, for free-standing
ﬁrst lien hybrid mortgages with stated documentation originated in California. The left plot
shows the 60-day delinquency rates for loans with low broker proﬁts, and the right plot shows
the corresponding rates for high-broker-proﬁt loans. Broker proﬁts are estimated using the
model described in columns four through six in Table 9. High-broker-proﬁt (low-broker-proﬁt)
loans are those in the upper (lower) tercile of the conditional broker proﬁt distribution.
59A. Sample Construction
We started from the approximately 3.2 million loans in the NCEN data base. We select all
wholesale loan applications between 1997 and 2006 that have a valid funding decisions,
that is, the decision was either “funded”, “declined”, or “withdrawn”. We require a
valid broker number, property zip code, a loan amount that is between $10,000 and
$1,000,0000, a combined loan-to-value ratio between 0 and 150, a Fico score between 300
and 850, we dropped loans with missing Fico score loans, a debt-to-income ratio between
0 and 100, and a mortgage rate greater than 0 and less than 25%. This step reduces the
sample by approximately 46% to approximately 1.5 million observations.
We use this “pre-sample” to compute broker variables such as the indicator for an
“Active Broker”, which depends on whether a given broker submitted a loan application
during the previous month and the Broker Fund Rate which takes the ratio of funded
loan applications to all applications. We identify brokers by the broker numbers and in
a second step we combine multiple broker numbers that appears to refer to the same
broker ﬁrm based on the broker name and the location of properties.
To identify piggyback loans among our funded loans we look for matching ﬁrst lien
loan for any valid funded second lien loan. We match on the funding date, the borrower’s
age, the Fico score, the appraisal value for the property, the purpose of the loans, the
occupancy status, and the property city and zip. Using this scheme we can match the
vast majority of the funded second lien loans in our sample
We construct regulation variables following the deﬁnitions used in Ho and Pennington-
Cross (2005), Ho and Pennington-Cross (2006), Pahl (2007), and Kleiner and Todd
(2007), and extending the variables when necessary to our sample period. All these
variables are deﬁned by year and state.
We collect zip code level census variables on race, ethnicity, and education. We
match these variables with our loan records and drop loan records that have no match
potentially because of an incorrect zip code.
60In constructing our ﬁnal sample of funded loans we include only funded loans that
are either free-standing ﬁrst lien loans or a match of a ﬁrst lien and a second lien loan
that forms an observation of a piggyback loan. We drop any second lien loans that were
not matched. We trim the observations by dropping the observations with the lowest and
highest 1% of broker revenue. In our current version we focus on loans that are either
ﬁxed-rate, hybrid, or have a balloon payment. We drop interest-only, various agency,
and others type of loans that are less common. These steps generate a sample size of
715,011.
B. Moment Conditions for the Frontier Model
The model is:
fi,j + yi,j ≡ wi,j
= Xi,jγ
0 +  i,j + ξi,j,
where  i,j is normally distributed with standard deviation σ and ξi,j is exponentially
distributed with mean parameter λi,j = exp(Xi,jβ0).11 Both random variables  i,j and
ξi,j are assumed to be independent of each other, conditional on Xi,j.
With qi,j =  i,j+ξi,j, we derive the density of qi,j in order to compute the log-likelihood
function for our parameter estimation. Using the formula for the cumulative distribution
function (cdf) for sums of independent random variables, we obtain












where Φ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Letting φ be the
standard normal density, and omitting subscripts i,j to simplify notation, the density
11To keep things simple, we assume a constant variance ¾2 for the symmetric error term ²i,j. Extensions
to the more general form of ¾i,j in equation (9) are straightforward.















































































The third line follows from completing the square, the fourth line from the deﬁnition of
the normal cdf, and the ﬁnal line from the symmetry of the normal cdf.
Using the functional form for λi,j, the contribution to the log-likelihood for one ob-
servation therefore is:























Let (ˆ γ, ˆ σ, ˆ β) be the maximum likelihood estimates and let ˆ qi,j be the empirical resid-
uals for the model, that is, ˆ qi,j = wi,j − Xi,jˆ γ0. Diﬀerentiating the overall log-likelihood
L =
∑
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62The properties of the joint distribution of  i,j and ξi,j imply
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+ ˆ qi,j − ˆ σ
2e
¡Xi,j ˆ β0
as generalized residuals for the model, which must be orthogonal to the conditioning
information.
63Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics for Regulation and Census Variables The table reports
the means for the regulation and neighborhood variables in our sample. The coverage and restriction
variables are deﬁned as indexes that count the number of additional types of mortgages covered and the
additional number of restrictions impose over and above the HOEPA regulations. The mortgage broker
regulations variables are measured by the index developed in Pahl (2007) that aggregates several types
of mortgage broker regulations and the measure used by Kleiner and Todd (2007) that measures the
ﬁnancial bonding requirements for mortgage brokers. The regulations variables are measured by state
and by year. The census variables are measured by zip code and year. The household income variable
is the median household income. The means are reported for three periods, 1997-199, 2000-2003, and
2004-2006, by census divisions with CA, FL, TX broken out.
Funded Loans Regulation Census
State(s) Num. of Percent Anti-predatory Broker White Hispanic Education Household
Loans Cvrge Restr Pahl KT (%) (%) (%) Income
1997-1999
California 7,265 19.4 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.0 56.4 31.2 15.9 50.7
Florida 2,994 8.0 0.0 0.0 6.5 0.0 75.0 19.8 13.3 40.0
Texas 2,098 5.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 62.7 32.2 15.5 43.2
Paciﬁc w/o CA 1,730 4.6 0.0 0.0 3.6 1.8 78.9 6.5 16.4 44.8
Mountain 3,529 9.4 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.8 78.1 23.3 15.8 44.0
West South Central w/o TX 444 1.2 0.0 0.0 3.3 1.9 65.6 3.7 14.2 35.0
East South Central 834 2.2 0.0 0.0 4.9 4.4 75.3 1.7 12.2 36.2
South Atlantic w/o FL 3,674 9.8 0.1 0.2 3.2 1.4 58.5 4.0 14.3 41.6
West North Central 2,396 6.4 0.0 0.0 1.9 1.2 78.9 3.9 16.8 45.8
East North Central 8,960 23.9 0.0 0.0 4.4 3.7 65.3 7.9 13.5 43.7
Mid Atlantic 2,220 5.9 0.0 0.0 4.8 0.5 75.0 5.1 12.0 36.2
New England 1,363 3.6 0.0 0.0 1.8 0.9 85.2 6.9 17.7 51.3
All 37,507 100.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 1.4 67.8 15.1 14.8 44.3
2000-2003
California 69,752 30.5 4.7 1.3 3.0 0.0 56.2 33.8 14.3 49.2
Florida 19,738 8.6 0.0 2.4 6.0 0.0 75.2 21.1 13.7 41.3
Texas 12,983 5.7 1.7 3.4 6.0 2.5 64.5 31.2 16.1 45.8
Paciﬁc w/o CA 7,788 3.4 0.0 0.0 4.4 2.1 78.0 7.0 16.7 46.8
Mountain 16,881 7.4 0.1 0.7 2.2 1.0 78.6 21.8 16.2 46.4
West South Central w/o TX 3,639 1.6 0.2 0.2 4.4 3.5 64.6 3.8 13.4 35.4
East South Central 7,916 3.5 0.0 0.3 4.8 5.7 69.4 1.7 12.2 36.8
South Atlantic w/o FL 14,546 6.4 1.5 1.9 3.9 2.5 63.6 4.7 17.2 49.8
West North Central 9,688 4.2 0.0 0.0 2.6 2.2 82.3 3.9 16.7 45.7
East North Central 39,763 17.4 1.9 1.5 4.6 3.9 67.9 7.8 13.2 44.8
Mid Atlantic 13,533 5.9 2.7 1.9 4.9 4.3 70.5 11.8 15.1 51.7
New England 12,266 5.4 3.8 5.6 3.3 2.0 81.4 9.1 16.3 49.5
All 228,493 100.0 2.3 1.7 3.9 1.8 67.1 18.9 14.8 46.7
2004-2006
California 118,383 26.4 7.0 2.0 3.0 0.0 55.5 37.9 11.9 45.2
Florida 47,691 10.6 0.0 4.0 6.0 0.0 74.3 20.9 13.0 40.3
Texas 27,287 6.1 2.0 4.0 6.0 2.5 67.7 31.2 16.7 47.4
Paciﬁc w/o CA 21,697 4.8 0.0 0.0 4.6 1.9 66.4 7.2 16.2 48.1
Mountain 39,028 8.7 0.9 1.8 3.2 1.3 78.8 22.1 15.1 46.7
West South Central w/o TX 6,123 1.4 2.8 4.6 5.7 4.1 72.4 3.9 13.8 37.2
East South Central 12,405 2.8 0.0 1.1 6.2 7.2 73.2 1.9 12.7 37.9
South Atlantic w/o FL 34,341 7.7 3.4 4.4 4.0 3.0 60.3 4.4 16.2 48.8
West North Central 15,554 3.5 0.0 0.0 2.7 2.7 83.0 3.5 16.1 44.7
East North Central 54,864 12.2 3.6 4.2 5.5 4.6 68.1 7.0 12.8 43.3
Mid Atlantic 46,711 10.4 5.2 4.3 5.8 4.8 66.7 12.4 13.8 48.7
New England 24,927 5.6 4.0 5.9 3.5 2.0 81.4 9.5 14.9 46.0
All 449,011 100.0 3.5 3.1 4.4 2.1 67.0 19.6 13.8 45.2
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Lenders use "rate sheets" to tell mortgage brokers the interest rates, terms and costs of different loans. These sheets helped brokers find ways to make
loans to borrowers who had blemished credit or wanted loan terms that traditional lenders were less likely to approve. Brokers could choose from a variety
of loan options for borrowers with high and low credit scores. (See related article.)
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